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Abstract 
American politics is divisive (like many political systems worldwide now), and there are calls 
for censorship and de-platforming which are arguably anti-democratic. On the other hand, there 
are some rather unprincipled political actors who are perhaps not entirely honest, so one could 
legitimately argue for censorship in some cases. The present work aimed to examine 
psychological biases which influence support of censorship of another person; specifically, 
either a BLM or ALM-supporting protester. Using an experimental design with two 
Mechanical Turk samples (Study 1 N = 294; Study 2 N = 428), the study finds support for the 
hypotheses that when people have an opposing view to a protester, they are more likely to 
believe the protester has an ulterior motive, think they are giving a political signal, have a 
negative perceptions of the protester, and think sharing their view would be harmful, thus 
increasing support of censorship. These results support and add to the current literature of 
censorship and collective activism. 
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Attitudes towards Censorship of Political Movements in the United States of America: 
#AllLivesMatter and #BlackLivesMatter 
The debate surrounding censorship will always be a contentious issue, with debate 
around what is deemed appropriate to share and how we should react, being a constant 
discussion in daily politics. Instances of censorship may vary from a person altering what 
they post as a Facebook status (see Kwon et al., 2015), preventing speakers from giving 
speeches at universities (see Rankin, 2018), to the currently controversial censorship of 
information both internally and externally in the People’s Republic of China in regards to the 
2020 Coronavirus outbreak (see Zhong, 2020). Freedom of speech is an idea that is widely 
considered a human right and an important aspect of many societies (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1948). A Pew Research Center study reported a median of 62% participants from 
27 countries said that the right to freely express their views is protected, with the degree of 
perceived protection increasing in advancing economies (Wike et al., 2019).  
However, despite the wide support and endorsement of free speech, why is censorship 
still a concept that is entertained today? In the current socio-political climate where in some 
areas it appears that the world is stepping up and empowering people to speak out that have 
found it difficult or had no possibility of doing so before (e.g., the global #MeToo 
movement), there are still instances of people being shut down and silenced (e.g., the murder 
of journalist Jamal Khashoggi). At a time where it seems like everybody has access to a 
platform to share their views, it is no wonder that there are some supporters of censorship on 
an everyday level. In democratic societies, such as the United States of America, people are 
tiptoeing in the grey area between freedom of speech and the right to not be bombarded with 
obscene messages. How people differ on what they think is acceptable and tolerable will vary 
greatly, between each individual person. Group membership is a salient item of an 
individual’s identity, and thus, people may support censorship if it disagrees with their 
identities as members of salient groups. 
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An individual’s identity is complex and developed from many different areas of one’s 
life. What people choose as central to their identity is entirely unique and varied from person 
to person. One’s social identity helps an individual to relate to members of the same social 
group (the in-group) and helps guide interaction with persons outside of the in-group (Stets & 
Burke, 2000). A person’s membership to a social group influences how they think, feel, and 
behave. An example of one commonly held salient factor for a person’s identity is political 
partisanship (Green et al., 2004). No matter what area of the world a person comes from, 
politics will often be a sensitive issue for people to discuss, particularly if you are unsure of 
the political standing of those around you. The aphorism that one should never discuss 
religion or politics in polite conversation, on the surface may be a simple social guide to 
avoid uncomfortable conflict with people, but may encompass a wider psychological service 
(Papacharissi, 2004). 
Social identity  
Social identity can be thought of as salient features of an individual’s identity, that are 
generated based on their social grouping (Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Stets & Burke, 2000; Tajfel, 
1982). By figuring out what one considers important enough to hold fast when interacting 
with a range of different people, across different situations, gives a reasonably strong 
indication what is truly important to us. However, this does not necessarily mean that we will 
make every aspect of our identity present in every situation. A person will adapt what 
features of themselves are present depending on the context, thus indicating that social 
identity is a dynamic feature in one’s identity (Cains, 1982; Ethier & Deaux, 1994). For 
example, it may be entirely appropriate to be extroverted and boisterous when you are 
hanging out with your friends, however, if you are in a work meeting, it may not be 
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considered appropriate to be fooling around and making jokes. These factors are what can be 
considered to make up an individual’s social identity (Cains, 1982; Tajfel, 1982).  
Political and social identity are linked to what “group” one identifies with 
(Deschamps, 2012). Many factors can influence what group an individual will identify with, 
but once an identification is made, it tends to be an aspect of one’s identity which is likely to 
remain constant throughout one’s life (Green et al., 2004). While active interest typically 
waxes and wanes in relation to political elections, Green and colleagues (2004) suggest that 
for many people, political identity remains constant from the age of approximately thirty 
years, and is relatively unaffected by extreme political events, such as economic recession or 
scandals. Furthermore, as level of connection to a political party increases, individuals start to 
view that party through a favorable light, thus highlighting positive aspects, and neglecting 
negative aspects (Green et al., 2004). 
Cains (1982) discussed the influence that political and social conflict may have on 
one’s social identity by focusing on people in Northern Ireland during the conflict which 
occurred from the 1960s to 1998. Two dominant social groups found in Ireland were 
Catholics and Protestants; not necessarily directly relating to religious beliefs, rather a 
grouping factor in the wider sense. When assessing census data, only 3% of the population 
failed to use either Catholic or Protestant as a describing factor of themselves. Despite this 
indication that Protestant-Catholic grouping was a salient feature to a large majority of the 
population, it was reported that there was not a case of outgroup devaluation in response to 
the conflicts, but rather a positive bias to the in-group.  
The US is now a place in which people deny obvious truths when those truths are 
associated with their political opponents. For example, liberals will disagree “all lives matter” 
and conservatives will disagree “black lives matter,” despite both sides presumably actually 
caring about all people’s lives (Bennett-Swanson, 2017; Horowitz & Livingston, 2016). To 
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maintain one’s standing within their group, people will inherently follow the majority 
opinion. This is a simple tool to avoid negative social interactions within one’s group. The 
justification-suppression model (White & Crandell, 2017) theorizes that one aspect of 
prejudicial speech arises from the need to conform to the social norms present in a group. 
Suppression is used by the individual to avoid voicing their true thoughts, in favor of voicing 
the in-group opinion. 
Social identity and group membership are powerful in shaping a range of actions and 
behaviors, from helping behaviors (Levine et al., 2005), and stress response (Haslam & 
Reicher, 2006) to collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2012). People often advocate and 
engage in collective action for their group, in order to make a difference which reflects the 
moral foundation of the group.  
Social activism  
Social activism has been a direct tool to aid in potential changes to issues on a large 
scale. Whether the scale be affecting just one specific community or reaches attention to 
promote change on a national level, the hope is to raise attention for a specific issue. This is 
done by challenging the existing government to take notice and be aware that the group will 
not let the issue go lightly.  
When individuals participate in collective action, an individual begins to think, feel, 
and act as part of a group, rather than as an individual, and motivation is sourced from the 
will to improve the situation of the group (Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren, 2014). Tausch 
and colleagues examined differences between normative and non-normative collective action 
regarding efficacy and emotional mechanisms for actions. Non-normative action 
encompasses more extreme and aggressive political actions. It was observed that anger 
significantly predicted willingness to engage in normative action, but not when action was 
carried out by a third party (the government). Contempt significantly predicted an 
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individual’s willingness to engage in non-normative collective action, while anger only 
partially predicted this relationship. Furthermore, the perception of injustice, significantly 
predicted feelings of contempt and anger, thus proving to be a salient motivational factor for 
normative and non-normative action. 
Feinberg et al., (2020) examined how extreme protest actions effect perception of the 
movement that the protesters support. It was found across six different studies that when the 
protests became more extreme (e.g., blocking highways or vandalizing property), it reduced 
participant’s emotional connection with the movement, which in turn resulted in decreased 
overall identification and support of the movement. The current study intends to add to the 
research conducted by Feinberg and colleagues (2020), by examining not just perception of 
specific social movements, but seeing what factors may cause an observer of a non-extreme 
protester to encourage or and engage in censoring behavior, as extreme protesting, while 
more noticeable, would most likely only occur rarely in daily life. However, non-extreme, or 
peaceful protests, are much more common for most people to encounter (Andrews et al., 
2018), thus being able to possibly gain insight into a more likely interaction may be more 
beneficial for both organizers or protests, and for people to be aware of how they react when 
they encounter a protester.  
Given the strength at which political partisanship typically contributes to one’s 
identity, it would be plausible for it to also influence how individuals interpret and react to 
political statements. The statements “All Lives Matter” (ALM) and “Black Lives Matter” 
(BLM) have become polarizing statements that people on either side of the political spectrum 
reject (e.g. Horowitz & Livingston, 2016). Social identity theory (Tajfel et al., 1979) provides 
theoretical reasoning as to why conflict arises between different social groups. Tajfel and 
colleagues (1979) note that it is practically difficult for an individual to share views that 
conflict with a strongly held group mentality. It is thought that this is because in a social 
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platform, while an individual may be acting alone, they are still implicitly concerned with 
their in-group status and being a cohesive member of the group (Tajfel et al., 1979). 
While the issue of ensuring all persons, and in particular, people who belong to 
minority groups, receive equal rights is by no means a new issue across the world, one 
movement that gained particular traction in the USA was the BLM movement in 2013. The 
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter was first created after civilian George Zimmerman was found not 
guilty of the murder of unarmed, 17-year old, African American Trayvon Martin. It was 
created to draw attention to the injustice that many African Americans were facing in the 
USA from law enforcement (Lebron, 2017; Gallagher et al., 2018). On social media 
platforms the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter was used nearly 30 million times between the 
period of July 2013 to May 2018 (Anderson et al., 2018), and tended to spike in response to 
major events against African American people. It became a representation for a major social 
movement that was starting in the USA from that time. 
A 2016 Pew Research study specifically on how Americans views the BLM 
movement (Horowitz & Livingston, 2016). It was found that 43% of Americans support 
BLM movement, (of the 43% who support the BLM movement, 18% showed strong 
support), while 22% oppose. Horowitz and Livingston further examined how support differed 
by ethnicity and found that 40% of White Americans supported BLM, while 28% oppose. 
This level of support among Black Americans was unsurprisingly higher with 65% 
supporting and 12% opposing BLM. To examine if there was a difference based on partisan 
support of White Americans it was found that 20% of White Republicans supported BLM, 
while 52% opposed it. On the other hand, 64% of White Democrats supported the BLM 
movement, while only 8% opposed it. However, a Gallup poll reported that only 6% of 
Americans reported that they "felt the urge to organize or join a public demonstration" for 
Law Enforcement/Police Brutality/Black Lives Matter”. 3% of Republicans reported that 
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they would protest for Law Enforcement/Police Brutality/Black Lives Matter, while 6% of 
Democrats reported they would protest (Reinhart, 2018).  
However, the hashtag #AllLivesMatter began to appear as an alternative option for 
some, as a counter-protest which attempted to remove the factor of race. While the All Lives 
Matter (ALM) hashtag may present itself as a somewhat favorable alternative to 
#BlackLivesMatter, by removing the factor of race from the discussion, this removes the 
chance for the conversation that the BLM hashtag was attempting to create (Gallagher et al., 
2018).  
Gallagher and colleagues (2018) ran analyses of over 860,000 tweets which contained 
either hashtags, to examine any differences between the use of the hashtag in conversation. 
The ALM tweets showed greater law enforcement supporting statements in comparison to the 
BLM tweets. It was also found that ALM tweets were more susceptible to getting taken over 
by BLM supporters, while the BLM tweets were less likely to get derailed by opposing 
internet users. Despite the differences found between the two hashtags, it was observed that 
there was at least some discussion about the deaths of African Americans (while #BLM was 
significantly higher). 
Free speech 
 Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
clearly states “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. However, despite this 
article being written over 70 years ago, freedom of speech continues to be an ongoing issue. 
In an ideal world a clear balance would be in place, where people would have the freedom to 
discuss any topic they choose but be aware of what constitutes abusing this right by spreading 
hateful messages. This concept of a balance existing, in itself creates an issue of how and 
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who is capable to make an unbiased decision of what is considered acceptable. In any society, 
there are rules that everyone agrees to abide by in order to maintain a civil society. It is 
somewhat paradoxical that the person or people at the head of society may be able to say that 
it is acceptable to discuss one topic, but unacceptable to discuss another because it violates a 
commonly held view. But just because someone disagrees with a viewpoint does not 
necessarily make it unimportant. Discrimination under the guise of free speech is a pertinent 
issue, that cannot be ignored. However, that goes beyond the scope of this work.  
One possible avenue of interest that arises for the present research is that while free 
speech may be consistently supported within honest debate, does support of free speech 
diminish when dishonest actors enter the discussion? Group membership is a salient cue to 
infer another person’s mental state and intention (Reeder et al., 2005). One possible direction 
that could result if a person acts dishonestly, and it reflects poorly on the group, could be that 
the dishonest person faces rejection from the group. Marques and Paez (1994) observed that 
when an individual shares an opinion that varies from the commonly held view of the group, 
rejection of the individual occurs to ensure uniformity within the group. Furthermore, 
unfavorable in-group members were subsequently viewed as more negative than out-group 
members that held the same position (Marques & Paez, 1994).  
Dog-whistles  
At their core, both ALM and BLM statements reflect the desire for equal rights. 
However, these statements serve two functions: they are truth claims and they are social 
identity markers. As truth claims, nearly everyone would agree they are correct (who would 
suggest that the lives of black people do not matter, and who would argue that the lives of all 
people do not matter?). However, as discussed previously, clearly not everyone agrees with 
both statements. It is proposed that this may be caused by a psychological bias, in which 
certain people perceive an identity marker within the statement. As identity markers, people 
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will agree or disagree depending on the identity they express. This identity may be possibly 
linked to many aspects of an individual identity, however in the situation of dog-whistle 
statements, it is proposed that it is linked to partisanship, in part due to the polarizing findings 
in the Horowitz and Livingston (2016) study. This concept that a statement can be interpreted 
in different ways depending on what political identity one processes is referred to as a dog-
whistle. 
Similar to the use of codes to keep a message secret, the theory behind dog-whistle 
statements is based on the assumption that the target audience for the dog-whistle have held 
an underlying attitude towards a particular out-group (Haney-López, 2015; Wetts & Willer, 
2019). Dog-whistles have been observed in politics on multiple different occasions. Ranging 
from Ronald Reagan’s campaign in 1980, Regan states during a speech that “I believe in 
states’ rights” to Donald Trump’s campaign promises to “crack down on illegal aliens” and 
“build a wall” between Mexico and the USA. For some people the statements made may 
appear to be a clear statement, that many people would agree on without much thought. 
However, the idea behind the dog-whistle is that for those that support the figure, the 
statements serve as a double meaning, theoretically showing the true intentions behind the 
cause.  
For example, when Reagan said, “I believe in states’ rights,'' during a speech he gave 
in Mississippi during the 1980 campaign trail, the statement had varied interpretation. To 
some people, it could be interpreted as Reagan simply making a reference to the 
constitutional law. However, to certain people, a second interpretation was made. When 
Reagan gave his speech, this was at a time when racial equality was held as an undisputed 
right that people should have in the USA. Or at least that was what was thought of on the 
surface. By making this statement Reagan was aiming to speak to the voters, predominantly 
in the South of the United States, where racism was still active, and segregation was being 
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fought. Reagan was aiming to indicate to those southern voters that the decision about 
whether desegregation was applied would be handed back to the individual states. This was 
significant for Reagan’s political ambition because previously people from the South had 
been firm Democratic supporters, so by making this statement that he, a Republican nominee, 
shared some of the same values as they held.  
Because certain statements act as dog-whistles, when a dog-whistle statement is made 
with the intent of sharing an ulterior meaning to a certain group of people, people on the other 
side will deny their truth, despite them being inherently true. As the statements are dog-
whistles, the statements become more and more toxic to the other side, because moderates on 
the opposing side affected by the dog-whistle will not deny them (because they are obviously 
true) nor affirm them (because doing so would signal an opposing social identity). The 
statements become stronger signals of social identity and reduced identification as being truth 
claims. At the same time, people on the supportive side (and people in the middle) may still 
see them as truth claims and think it bizarre and irrational for the other side to deny them. 
It is important to note that the use of dog-whistle statements similar to ALM are not 
exclusively observed in the USA. In New Zealand, a similar statement “He iwi tahi tātou” or 
“We are now one people” was used by Governor Hobson upon signing of the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Hobson’s Pledge Trust, n.d.). The Treaty of Waitangi was intended to be a peace 
treaty between the tangata whenua and the new European settlers. On the surface Hobson’s 
statement of “we are now one people”, appears perfectly acceptable. Hobson intended to 
remove any reference to any specific ethnic group from all legislation. However, in hindsight, 
this can be viewed as an early attempt to try and reduce any direct influence that the Māori 
people may have in the governing of the country.  
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Censorship  
Censorship may occur in a range of different forms and degrees of severity. No matter 
how subtle an action may be perceived to be, if it limits another person’s ability to freely 
share their views in a safe manner, then that constitutes as censorship (Colman, 2015). In the 
current study, self-censorship is considered the act of refraining from speaking or acting due 
to the perceived perceptions of those around you. This may present itself in the form of 
partially or completely altering another person’s response or ability to act in a given situation. 
Furthermore, the act of censoring others is of also focus. The individual factors and 
psychological biases that influence a person’s likelihood to support censorship of another 
person will also be examined. 
When conflict arises between different groups of people, a tension can occur in regard 
to how individuals feel they are able to share or discuss certain statements or topics. For an 
individual, an internal conflict can arise, due to the desire to show one’s true opinions, but not 
wanting to go against the views of their in-group. This internal conflict can result in intra and 
interpersonal censorship. Interpersonal censorship is the act of censoring the behavior of 
others. Conversely, intrapersonal, or self-censorship, can occur when an individual feels the 
need to conform to the social norms of one’s group or to ease social interaction (Horton, 
2011; Loury, 1994). 
Biased processing of information, through possible heuristics such as the confirmation 
bias, suggest that when an individual is faced with information that opposes a strongly held 
belief or opinion, an individual will dismiss the conflicting information (Nickerson, 1998). 
Censoring of oneself and others speech when faced with information that seems incongruent, 
may reflect a similar result.   
A study examining academic freedom in the United Kingdom observed that 
participants were more likely to oppose any situation of hypothetical censoring of free 
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speech, but when it comes to supporting or condemning an act that has already occurred there 
was a much closer margin (Kaufmann, 2019). Therefore, indicating that people may possibly 
favor the idea of free speech, but when presented with a concrete case that has already 
occurred, they may have a better idea of what harm was caused, or assume that the action that 
was carried out was for the best, thus the change in positions.  
A 2019 study examined how people differed in acceptance towards protesters at a 
university campus, and how partisanship effected this relationship (Giersch, 2019). It was 
initially hypothesised that liberals would be more accepting of allowing protesters on 
campus, while conservatives would be more likely to support punitive action. Similar to the 
hypotheses outlined below for the current study, Giersch further hypothesised that increased 
punitive action would be reported when participants had opposing view to the protesters 
(2019). Interestingly, it was observed that of the conservative participants, the Mechanical 
Turk sample did indicate significantly increased willingness to punish the protester, while the 
student sample did not show this difference. It was suggested that this may have been due to 
either sample size differences (Mechanical Turk: n = 361; students: n = 164) or student’s 
non-volatile perception of their campus. The second hypothesis was fully supported across 
both student and Mechanical Turk participants, that participants were more punitive when the 
protester had opposing views. This was true of both conservative and liberal participants.  
It is hypothesized that the reason that statements, such as ALM and BLM, serve both 
as value claims and identity signals, and that people treat statements from their side as value 
claims, but statements from the other side as identity signals. The result is that people view 
others on their own side as making a straightforward value claim that seemingly any 
reasonable person would agree with—that the other side somehow disagrees with. This is a 
barrier to tolerance, because it makes the other side seem entirely unreasonable. 
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Psychology of hidden motives 
The perception of a person’s moral reasoning for performing an action can drastically 
alter perception of the outcome. Contrary to previous literature on side effects, Knobe 
(2003a) posed that the degree to whether a side effects may be intentional, is affected by 
one’s attitude towards the side effect. When participants of Knobe’s research were asked to 
judge whether a side effect was intentional or not, participants were significantly more likely 
to perceive intention in a harm condition, rather than a help condition. In a later paper Knobe 
extended the previous work (Knobe, 2003a), and proposed a that for an outcome to be 
considered intentional there are two components that must be met; skill and judgement of the 
outcome (2003b). If a person is considered to have sufficient skill to perform an action and 
the action is worthy of praise, then greater degree of intention is perceived when the act is 
completed. In comparison to the scenario where a person has no skill, but the act is still 
considered of praise, if the act is completed, there would be a perception of low intention.  
Vonasch and Baumeister (2017) extended the research examining the intention of side 
effects (Knobe 2003a; 2003b), through the introduction of the Tradeoffs Justification Model 
of the side-effect effect. Vonasch and Baumeister examined whether perception of intention 
of side effects would alter if the judgement being made violated sacred moral values. The 
Tradeoffs Justification Model considers the moral background of the decision being made, 
and the expected result of the action, thus interacting to form the side-effect effect. Thus, if a 
person is being forced to make a decision that is based on a sacred moral value (e.g., saving a 
persons life in a hospital), but there was a negative side-effect outside of the concept of the 
moral value (e.g., increased wait times for other patients), intention associated with the side 
effect would be lower, than if the decision was a non-sacred moral value.  
The perceived intention of an act, and the side effects that result, is crucial in the 
perception of ulterior motives. Research into ulterior motives compliments work into the 
15 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
side-effect effect and the Tradeoffs Justification Model (Knobe 2003a; 2003b; Vonasch & 
Baumeister, 2017) by specifically examining how a person views someone who hold 
opposing views. Reeder et al., (2005) observed that people have the tendency to assume 
negative motivation in someone who has an opinion that varies from their own. Moreover, 
this finding was exacerbated in people who strongly identified with the view of difference.   
The perception of ulterior motive in the political sphere compliments the literature of 
dog-whistle politics. Again, using the example of Ronald Reagan, “I believe in states’ rights,'' 
during his 1980 presidential campaign, the interpretation of this dog-whistle statement 
underlies the ulterior motive that Reagan held. As assessed by Reeder et al., (2005), people 
who opposed Reagan were more inclined to think that Reagan had a negative ulterior motive 
for using this statement. However, people who were supportive of Reagan, took the statement 
at face value, and were less likely to think Reagan had any negative meaning behind his 
words.  
Anyone that gets called out for censoring will have their own logical explanation for 
why they engaged in censorship. While this inherently contradicts the right of free speech, in 
some instances, this may be justified if the hidden motives that the person who has been 
censored are made clear and could cause obvious harm. While free speech is meant to support 
people with legitimate views conversing, people can abuse it to further dangerous objectives. 
Or at least, people might believe this to be true.  
The Present Study 
There has been a lot of interest surrounding the statements Black Lives Matter and All 
Lives Matter over the last seven years since the terms were coined, however, there is no 
currently existing study which examines how they act as truth statements and identity 
markers for political partisanship. While non-participation as a form of self-censorship has 
been studied (see Hayes et al., 2006), further research into censorship of others has not been 
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examined within the context of the All Lives Matter and Black Lives Matter movements. The 
proposed study intends to fill this current gap in the literature, through two studies which 
examine various possible factors which may influence censorship of others. 
There are two aims of the proposed research. The fist aim is to identify that 
participants respond differently to statements when they have a political affiliation to them, 
compared to statements which do not. Study 1 aims to address this by asking participants to 
indicate and explain their support for the statements “Do you support the statement “Black 
Lives Matter”?” with “it is important to protect the lives of black people?” and “Do you 
support the statement “All Lives Matter”?” with “is important to protect everybody's lives?”. 
Study 2 aims to identify whether participants would hypothetically actively censor a person 
when that person is sharing their views publicly on the statements ALM or BLM.  
In Study 1 Participants will be asked to give a yes/no response to indicate whether 
they support both the political and non-political, rephrased statement. They will explain their 
reasoning for their response to the politicized statement. Participants will be asked whether 
the politicized and nonpoliticized statements have equal meaning, and whether they believe 
people share their view on the political statement to give a political signal.  
In Study 2, the key dependent variable that we are aiming to assess is censorship of 
others. Participants are first asked to indicate their level of agreement towards the movements 
ALM and BLM, and the idea that black/all lives matter. Next, participants are given a 
vignette, and asked answer questions about how they would judge a person that is loudly and 
publicly supporting either ALM or BLM. Five measures were created to aim to assess 
different factors which may contribute to censorship (Does the protester have an ulterior 
motive?  Is the protester sharing the statement to signal their political identity? Whether they 
think they are a bad person, whether sharing their views is harmful, and whether they should 
be censored). Furthermore, the participants are also asked to indicate their level of support to 
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seven various further actions (beat up, fired, given an award, go to jail, be shown on the local 
news, be publicly shamed, and have their views monitored).  
It is important to be able to gain insight into the various factors which affect 
censorship. In a socially aware environment, where freedom of speech is a right, gaining 
awareness of how and what information gets presented and shared is paramount. While from 
an external view, one cannot directly influence what another person shares, if an insight of 
what certain people are willing to share, and where common ground can be found, an 
understanding of true stance could be obtained. 
Furthermore, it is also important to explore how political identity and various 
censorship types relate. This may be able to assist in gaining insight into understanding how 
and why people respond when faced with beliefs which are incongruent to their own. It may 
also aid in promoting positive interactions between people with differing political opinions, 
which may be particularly beneficial in times of political unrest. 
Hypotheses 
All hypotheses were pre-reregistered. Based on findings of previous research and 
literature, while considering online trends and the current political climate in the U.S.A, the 
following hypotheses were formulated;  
Study 1 Hypotheses.  
Hypothesis One (H1): It is hypothesised that statement support will be influenced by 
partisanship in such a way that liberals will be more likely to support BLM and conservatives 
will be more likely to support ALM. No hypothesis is given in regard to participants in the 
control condition as it is not based on any existing movement.  
Hypothesis Two (H2): There will be widespread agreement with the nonpoliticized 
statement. However, participants who agree with each politicized statement will agree that it 
means "[group] should receive fair treatment and justice under the law" (the non-politicized 
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statement). However, participants who disagree with the statement will be less likely to agree 
the statement means that.  
Hypothesis Three (H3): Participants who do not support the politicized statements 
will think the statements are motivated by political signaling to a greater extent than 
participants who do support the politicized statements. 
Study 2 Hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Four (H4): Participants who disagree with the political statement and do 
not identify with the movement will be more likely to indicate that they would be in support 
of censorship towards a hypothetical person who agrees with the movement and statement, in 
comparison to participants that agree with the protesters statement and movement.  
Hypothesis Five (H5): Participants will be more willing to censor others when they 
think they have an ulterior motive, when they think the statement is an political signal, when 
they think they are a bad person, when they think sharing the views is harmful. Furthermore, 
support of possible reactions to the protester are also of interest (e.g., be fired). It is predicted 
that support of possible reactions will also be predicted by the same factors as mentioned 
above. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, participants were asked to consider their individual views towards a 
political and non-politicized statement and give brief reasoning for those views. Before 
examining attitudes towards censorship of a BLM or ALM-supporting protester, it was 
important to fist ensure that there was a true difference in viewpoint between different group 
members of the two movement. Therefore, Study 1 examines how people interpret the two 
statements, whether support for the statements is influenced by partisanship, and whether 
people thing that statements act as political signals. 
19 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Method 
Participants 
Our preregistered sample (https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=26he9p) for Study 1 
was 300 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In total, 304 American participants 
were recruited and completed the study. After the attention checks were applied, 10 
participants were removed, thus data collected from 294 participants were used for analysis. 
This study was completed on October the 15th, 2019. The participants had a mean age of 
36.9 years (SD = 11.2; range = 42) and 46.5% (n = 140) were females. Participants came 
from a range of different ethnicities and races; 9.0% identified as Black, 74.1% as white, 
0.7% as American Indian, Alaskan Native, or Native American, 6% as Hispanic, and 1.7% as 
Other.  The split of political partisanship was slightly leaning to the left but was consistent 
across conditions; 18% identified as very liberal, 20% as liberal, 12% as somewhat liberal, 
21% as moderate, 11% as somewhat conservative, 13% as conservative, and 5% as very 
conservative. 
Manipulation 
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three conditions (ALM (n = 98), 
BLM (n = 100), or Control (n = 96)). In the control condition, the statement “Asian Lives 
Matter” was presented to participants, with the non-politicized statement “Do you think that 
Asian people should receive fair treatment and justice under the law?”. The selected control 
group used was intended to be unprovocative of any strong opinions on average was used. 
Each condition consisted of a political statement and a rephrased synonymous statement. See 
Appendix A for the full list of questions posed in each condition. The order of statements 
shown was randomly presented.  
Measures 
 Statement Support. Participants were asked to say if they did or did not support the 
statement (yes/no) and give a brief statement to explain their reasoning. The explanation 
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acted as an attention check, as anyone who answered nonsensically (e.g. “I think this”, or 
“khfsdk”) was not included in the analysis.  
 Equal Meaning. A measure of whether participants thought the political and non-
politicized statements had the same meaning. For example, “In your opinion does "All Lives 
Matter", mean the same as "everybody should receive fair treatment and justice under the law"?”. 
Participants responded using a 6-point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), 
Somewhat Disagree (3), Somewhat Agree (4), Agree (5), Strongly Agree (6)). 
 Political Signal. A measure of whether participants thought people said the political 
statement to give a political signal. For example, “In your opinion, do people mainly say, 
"Black Lives Matter" to signal their political allegiance?”. Participants responded using a 6-
point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Somewhat Disagree (3), Somewhat Agree 
(4), Agree (5), Strongly Agree (6)). 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via the survey site Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants 
first read through the information sheet and had to indicate their consent after reading the 
consent form (See Appendix A). For those who continued to the questionnaire, participants 
were asked to say if they did or did not support the both the political and non-political 
statement (yes (1) or no (0)) and give a brief statement to explain the reasoning. Participants 
were then asked to indicate whether they thought the political and non-politicized statements 
had the same meaning. Then, participants were asked to indicate whether they thought people 
said the political statement as was to give a political signal Finally, participants were asked to 
provide various demographic information. The full questionnaire for Study 1 is presented in 
Appendix A. 
21 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Research Design  
This study had an experimental design. The dependent variables where response to 
the question “Do you support [group] lives matter]?”. To examine whether participants 
agreed that the politicized and non-politicized statements have the same meaning, planned 
contrasts within a 3 (ALM, BLM, AsianLM) x 2 (agree/disagree with politicized statement) 
mixed model ANOVA was used.  
Results 
 Before analysis was conducted, attention checks were conducted to ensure that 
participants paid enough attention while completing the study. 4% (n = 11) participants were 
removed from the dataset, due to failing the attention check. To conduct the analysis of Study 
1, all decisions of significance were assessed using a significance level of α = .05. To ensure 
there was no order effect, an order variable was included, for each initial analysis. All 
analyses were pre-registered. 
Influence of Partisanship 
To examine whether overall political standing predicted statement support of the 
political statements, binomial logistic regression was performed. It was hypothesised that 
more liberal participants would be more likely to support BLM, while the more conservative 
participants would be more likely to support ALM. The analysis was first run including the 
order variable, to examine whether the order in which the non-political and political 
statement were presented had any effect on participant response.  Order was found to be non-
significant (p = .644), therefore, the analysis was repeated with order removed.  
It was observed that there is was a significant interaction between participant’s overall 
political stance and condition when predicting participant level of support for the political 
statements, as shown in Table 2. Furthermore, Figure 1 illustrates the interaction between 
condition and political support. It was shown that the more liberal a person is, the more likely 
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they are to support BLM, while the more conservative a person is, the more likely they are to 
support ALM, thus supporting H1. The control condition did not indicate a significant 
relationship between condition and overall political support (see Figure 1).  
Table 2  
Coefficients of Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Support of Politicised Statement 
Predictor Estimate SE Z p 
Intercept  0.7270  0.445  1.635  0.102  
Group_Condition:           
BLM – Control  2.0055  0.738  2.716  0.007  
ALM – Control  -2.3230  0.693  -3.350  < .001  
Overall Political Standing  -0.0559  0.115  -0.485  0.628  
Group_Condition ✻ Overall Political Standing:           
(BLM – Control) ✻ Overall Political Standing  -0.5130  0.178  -2.874  0.004  
(ALM – Control) ✻ Overall Political Standing  0.7065  0.197  3.584  < .001  
Note. Estimates represent the log odds of "Support Politicised = Yes" vs. "Support Politicised = 
No" 
Figure 1  
Interaction plot of Political Support and Condition in Predicting Support of Political Statement 
 
Note. Overall Political Standings, 1 – Very Liberal and 7 – Very Conservative; Support of Statement = 1 
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Equal Statements 
Level of support for the non-politicized statement in comparison to the political 
statement was of interest. In the Control condition the whole sample supported the non-
politicized statement, while 64% supported the political statement. In the BLM condition 
97% of the sample indicated support for the non-politicized statement, while 64% supported 
the political statement. In the ALM condition 99% indicated support for the non-politicized 
statement, while 62% supported the political statement. Therefore, as the percentages of 
supported differed between the two statements, further analysis was conducted. 
The second analysis that was conducted examined whether statement support 
influenced participant’s belief that the given political statement had equal meaning with the 
corresponding non-political statement. The analysis was first run including the order variable, 
to examine whether the order in which the non-political and political statement were 
presented had any effect on participant response. Order was non-significant (p = .629), 
therefore, the analysis was repeated with order removed. It was observed that there was a 
significant relationship between statement support and whether participants believe that the 
political statement has equal meaning with the non-political statement (F(1, 287) = 358.12, p 
< .001, η2 = 0.546). The interaction between group condition and support of the political 
statement was non-significant (F(2, 287) = 2.94, p = .055, η2 = 0.009), thus, a pre-registered 
planned comparison of the marginal means was conducted to examine if there was significant 
difference within the conditions. The marginal means were examined and are displayed in 
Figure 2 and give support to the posed hypotheses that those that support the political 
statements believe that there is equal meaning between the political statement and non-
political statement, thus supporting H2.  
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Political Signal 
The third analysis that was conducted examined whether statement support influenced 
participant’s belief that the political statements are used as a political signal. The analysis was 
first run including the order variable, to examine whether the order in which the non-political 
and political statement were presented had any effect on participant response. Order was non-
significant (p = .979), therefore, the analysis was repeated with order removed. It was 
observed that there was a significant relationship between statement support and whether 
participants believe that the political statement has equal meaning with the non-political 
statement (F (1,287) = 21.16, p < .001, η2 = 0.064). A significant interaction between support 
of political statement and condition was observed (F(2, 287) = 6.64, p = .002, η2 = 0.040) and 
is displayed in Figure 3 and supports H3 that those that support the political statements have 
lower levels of belief that the statements are used as political signals. However, no difference 
was observed in the AsianLM group, which could be explained because this is not a 
statement used in real politics.  
Note. On Y-Axis, Equal Meaning: 1 = Strongly Disagree 6 = Strongly Agree 
Figure 2 
Estimated Marginal Means: Group Condition ✻ Support of Political Statement 
to Predict Perception of Equal Meaning  
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 The first study sought to explore whether people differed in support between the two 
political statements “All Lives Matter” and “Black Lives Matter”. As hypothesized, support 
towards the two statements was influenced by partisanship. The more liberal a person was, 
the more likely they were to support BLM, while the more conservative you are, are more 
likely they are to support BLM. As expected, people’s political beliefs did not influence their 
support for the non-politicized control statement Asian Lives Matter. Thus, people’s political 
beliefs were associated with their support for ALM and BLM, but not semantically similar 
phrases about nonpoliticized groups.  
The use of social media to promote and discuss social movements has enabled the 
growth of social movements on a large scale (e.g. Anderson et al., 2018). However, as 
discussed by Faris et al., (2017) platforms such as Twitter and Facebook are highly partisan, 
Note. On Y-Axis, Equal Meaning: 1 = Strongly Disagree 6 = Strongly Agree 
Figure 3  
Marginal Estimated Means: Group Condition ✻ Support of Political Statement to Predict Perception of 
Political Signal 
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in particular, centre-left and far right. Thus, the initial perception that support of BLM and 
ALM are highly influenced by partisanship may have possibly been skewed by the 
underlying partisan bias within social media. However, it was found that this was not the 
case, thus giving supporting evidence to the claim that liberals are more likely to support 
BLM and reject ALM, while the opposite is the case for conservative. Thus, supporting H1. 
As well as stating support of a political statement, participants also indicated their 
support for a non-politicized version of the political statement. This was of interest to 
examine whether people who support the political statement see the statement as a truth 
statement. For example, if a participant was in the BLM condition, they indicated support to 
both “Black Lives Matter” and to the phrase “Do you think that all black people should 
receive fair treatment and justice under the law, alongside all people?”. Almost the entire 
sample (98.6%) agreed with the non-politicized statement, however only 63.3% of the sample 
agreed with the political statements (individual condition percentages are shown previously). 
Furthermore, when participants were asked whether they thought the political statement and 
non-politicized statements were equal, it was observed that participants who had indicated 
agreement towards the political statement were more likely to agree that had equal meaning 
to the non-politicized statement. Whereas, participants who disagreed with the political 
statement were more likely to disagree the political statement had equal meaning to the non-
politicized statement. As equal meaning was observed across all three conditions this 
supports hypothesis two.  
 The non-politicized statements were created to try and encompass the values that are 
important at the core of both the BLM (https://blacklivesmatter.com/what-we-believe/) and 
the ALM movement (Gallagher et al., 2018). When a cause aligns with an individual’s person 
beliefs and norms, it makes it much more likely for an individual to support a cause (Stern et 
al., 1999). Thus, belief that the political statement is equivalent to the non-politicized 
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statement enables the political statement to be perceived as a truth statement by supporters, as 
almost everyone supports the non-politicised statement. This belief may ease the 
psychological discomfort that is possibly faced by supporters when they are confronted by 
opponents to either movement. Belief in the truth statement, in turn, then may act as a 
justification for the possible actions towards people that do not support either movement. 
This idea is further examined in Study 2. 
The final analysis of Study 1 observed that participants that supported the political 
statement were more likely to disagree that people share their stance towards the statement to 
signal their political allegiance. However, participants that did not support the political 
statement were more likely to agree that people share their stance towards the statement to 
signal their political allegiance. This was observed in both the ALM and BLM conditions, but 
not in the control condition. Thus, supporting H3. 
The result that people who opposed either movements were more likely to think that 
people mainly share their view of the movement to signal their political allegiance may be 
related to the previous finding that partisanship significantly predicted support of the ALM 
and BLM movements, and the non-significant finding in the control condition for both 
analyses. If the partisan nature behind the movements is relatively well known, then 
participants may automatically make assumptions about someone else if either political 
preference or view towards either movement is known.  
Perception that people may share their view of social movements to signal their 
political allegiance may generate the belief that the signal has an ulterior motive. Following 
the result of the second analysis, that people who opposed the movement did not believe that 
the political statement had equal meaning to the non-politicized statement could be related to 
perception of political signaling. If participants do not believe that the political statement acts 
as an equivalent truth statement to the same degree of supporters, then they generate their 
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own plausible ulterior motive to explain why the person has shared their view. This potential 
reasoning is examined further in Study 2. 
Study 2  
 Building off Study 1, this study aimed to test specific psychological biases which 
increased a person’s support of censorship towards either an ALM or BLM-supporting 
protester. Five measures were created (censorship, ulterior motive, political signal, negative 
perception, and perception of harm), which were hypothesized to be influential on support of 
censorship, in addition to seven potential consequences. These measures and consequences 
were assed individually to examine how identification effected response to the measure, then 
a full model which aimed to predict censorship was modelled. Furthermore, mediation 
analyses were conducted to examine the mediating effect of the four measures on censorship.  
Method 
Participants 
Our preregistered sample (https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=gr7zv6) for Study 2 
was 500 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In total, 502 American participants 
were recruited and completed the study. After the attention checks were applied, 74 
participants were removed, thus data collected from 428 participants were used for analysis. 
This study was completed on December 10th – 12th, 2019. The participants had a mean age of 
35.8 years (SD = 10.6; range = 41) and 42.6% (n = 182) were females (two participants 
responded as other). Participants came from a range of different ethnicities and races; 9.8% 
identified as Black, 75.6% as white, 0.9% as American Indian, Alaskan Native, or Native 
American, 7.7% as Asian or Pacific Islander, 4.0% as Hispanic, and 1.9% as Other.  This was 
a very similar racial distribution, in comparison to Study 1. There was a relatively even split 
of political support across the three groups. This data is displayed in Figure 4.  
Figure 4 
29 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Spread of Political Partisanship within conditions 
 
Manipulation 
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of two conditions (ALM n = 216; 
BLM n = 212). The conditions varied depending on whether the protester in their condition 
was either an ALM-supporter or a BLM-supporter, thus some of the wording of specific 
questions varied based on condition (e.g., Do you believe that They don’t care about Black 
people? For the BLM condition, versus Do you believe that They don’t care about All 
people? For the ALM condition) See Appendix B for the full list of questions posed in each 
question. Both conditions gave support for both movements, but the movement that was not 
presented in the scenario was asked at the end of the main questionnaire block to avoid any 
potential priming effects.  
Measures 
 Statement Support. Participants were asked to say if they did or did not support the 
statement using a 7-point Likert scale (Fully Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Somewhat Disagree 
(3), Neither Disagree nor Agree (4), Somewhat Agree (5), Agree (6), Fully Agree (7)). It is noted 
that the response to the initial two questions is slightly different from Study 1, where 
participants answered on a dichotomous scale (yes/no). This was adjusted to enable a wider 
range of opinions to be expressed, so the effect of level of support could be examined. This 
was not necessary for Study. The participants were also asked to give a brief statement to 
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explain their reasoning. The explanation acted as an attention check, as anyone who answered 
nonsensically (e.g. “I think this”, or “khfsdk”) was not included in the analysis. 
Individual Measures Relating to Censorship. Five measures were designed, with the 
intention of encompassing various aspects that may influence people’s likelihood of engaging 
in censorship towards a BLM or ALM-supporting protester. Participants responded using a 6-
point Likert scale (Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Somewhat Disagree (3), Somewhat Agree 
(4), Agree (5), Strongly Agree (6)). This Likert scale response mimics the response scale used in 
Study 1.The internal consistency for each measure was measured by Cronbach’s α. The final 
Cronbach’s α is shown in line with the measure.  
Table 2 
Study 2 Measure Design 
  
Measure Question Cronbach’s Alpha 
Ulterior Motive  .934 
 Do you believe that they 
really want to protect the 
lives of X people? (RC) 
.899 
 Do you believe that they 
truly think the lives of X 
people are important? (RC)  
.900 
 Do you believe that they 
don’t care about X people? 
.927 
 Do you believe that they 
have an ulterior motive? 
.927 
Type of Person  .700 
 They are dangerous? .290 
 They are a good person? 
(RC) 
.538 
Harmful to Share  .908 
 They are working to 
improve society? (RC) 
.938 
 Sharing such views causes 
harm to society? 
.831 
 Sharing such views creates 
more hate in society? 
.830 
Censorship  .843 
 They should be able to share 
their views publicly? (RC) 
.819 
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 They should be able to 
speak freely? (RC) 
.814 
 People should not have to be 
exposed to such things in 
public places? 
.796 
 Their views should be 
celebrated? (RC) 
.858 
 Children should be protected 
from their views? 
.819 
Note. The fifth item consisted of one item (In your opinion, do people mainly say "X lives matter" to signal their 
political allegiance?), so it was not included in this table. *RC = Reverse Coded 
 Potential Consequences. Participants were asked to indicate their support of seven 
possible actions which should be carried out because the protester was sharing their view 
(they should be fired, the authorities should monitor their views, they should get an award, 
they should be on the local news, they should be publicly shamed, I wish someone would 
beat them up, they should be put in jail). Participants responded using a 6-point Likert scale 
(Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Somewhat Disagree (3), Somewhat Agree (4), Agree (5), 
Strongly Agree (6)). 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited via the survey site Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants 
first read through the information sheet and had to indicate their consent after reading the 
consent form (See Appendix B). Those who continued to the questionnaire were first asked to 
indicate their level of identification towards both movements, and how much they agreed 
with the idea of ALM/BLM. Participants were also asked to explain their reasoning for their 
given level of identification in an open-ended text box for both movements. Participants then 
moved onto the main section of the study. Participants were randomly and evenly split into 
either an ALM or BLM condition. The conditions varied based on whether the protester in 
the given scenario was either a BLM or an ALM supporter. In each condition the participants 
were presented with a scenario: 
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You are out in a public space and see someone wearing a t-shirt with the slogan "I 
support #All/BlackLivesMatter" and using a megaphone to broadcast their support 
for All/Black Lives Matter to the public. 
Participants were then asked to answer 23 questions which targeted five areas which were 
hypothesised to be potential psychological factors which would predict participants support 
of censoring the protester. The 23 questions are displayed in Appendix B. In addition to the 
five measures (but included in the 23 questions), participants were also asked to indicate their 
support of seven possible actions which should be carried out because the protester was 
sharing their view (e.g., they should be fired). Finally, participants were asked to provide 
various demographic information.  
Design 
 An experimental design was applied in this study. Linear regressions were used to 
examine the possible relationships between the dependent variables and the response to the 
question “Do you identify with the movement “All/Black Lives Matter?”. The dependent 
variables for these sets of analyses were the five measures and seven further actions. The 
independent variable was the response to the question “Do you support [group] lives 
matter?”. When the mediation analyses were conducted, the dependent variable was the 
measure censorship, the independent variable was response of identity to ALM/BLM, and the 
mediator variables were the four other measures, and the seven further actions. The full 
questionnaire is shown in Appendix B. 
Results 
Before analysis was conducted, attention checks were conducted to ensure that 
participants paid enough attention while completing the study. 15% (n = 74) of participants 
were removed from the dataset, due to failing one (22% of all exclusions) or both attention 
checks. Once the dataset had been cleaned, the dataset consisted of nine demographic 
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variables, five measures (consisting of 16 questions), seven variables relating to possible 
censorship actions, two short answer questions (used for attention checks), four variables 
assessing position on ALM and BLM, and a condition variable. Nine questions were 
transformed by reverse coding. To conduct the analyses of Study 2, all decisions of 
significant relationships were made using a significance level of α = .05 The significance 
level of .05 was used, upon consideration of Labovitz (1968) criteria for selecting a 
significance level. All analyses were pre-registered. 
Linear Regression Analyses  
To initially examine any interaction terms between each dependent variable and 
support for each movement within each condition multiple linear regression analyses were 
conducted. 
Belief that it is harmful to share views. As predicted, when participants had a 
similar viewpoint to the protester, they believed sharing the view was less harmful. For 
example, ALM supporters said sharing the pro-ALM view was less harmful than ALM 
opponents said (β1 = -0.469, t(215) = -14.062, p < .001), and BLM supporters said sharing the 
pro-BLM protesters’ views were less harmful than BLM opponents said (β1 = -0.315, t(211) = 
-8.430, p < .001; see Table 3 and Figure 5). Thus, people who disagree with either view were 
more likely to say it was harmful to share it publicly. 
Furthermore, when participants supported the opposite viewpoint of the protester (i.e., 
a BLM supporting participant judging an ALM-supporting protester) they believed sharing 
was more harmful. ALM supporters judging BLM protesters thought sharing their views was 
more harmful than ALM opponents thought (β1 = 0.186, t(211) = 4.604, p < .001). BLM 
supporters thought that sharing ALM views was significantly more harmful than their 
opponents (β1 = 0.295, t(215) = 6.941, p < .001). Thus, people who endorsed one view were 
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more likely to think the opposite view was potentially harmful – however, because many 
people endorse both views, this tendency was far weaker than the one above, where we 
directly measured people’s agreement with the view to be shared publicly. 
Table 3 
Comparison of marginal means for Perception of Harm within supporters of ALM and BLM with 95% CI 
Participant identification 
Stance of 
Protester 1 SD Below Mean 
Mean Level of 
Support 1SD Above Mean 
a) Identifies with ALM Pro-ALM 4.11 [3.89, 4.32] 3.10 [2.95, 3.26] 2.09 [1.87, 2.31] 
 Pro-BLM 2.16 [1.93, 2.38] 2.55 [2.39,2.71] 2.94 [2.72, 3.16] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 2.53 [2.30, 2.75] 3.15 [2.98, 3.32] 3.77 [3.54, 4.01] 
  Pro-BLM 3.25 [3.00, 3.50] 2.59 [2.42, 2.76] 1.93 [1.70, 2.16] 
 
 
Perception that the Protester has an Ulterior Motive. As predicted, when 
participants had a similar viewpoint to the protester, they thought that the protester had 
genuine reasons for protesting. For example, ALM opponents thought that that the ALM-
supporting protester had an ulterior motive for their actions, in comparison to ALM 
supporters who thought they had a genuine reason (β1 = -0.543, t(215) = -17.683, p < .001). 
Similarly, BLM opponents also agreed that the BLM-supporting protester had an ulterior 
motive, while the BLM opponents thought they had genuine reason (β1 = -0.185, t(211) = -
5.529, p < .001; see Table 4 and Figure 6). Therefore, people who disagree with either view 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
Figure 5 
Belief that it is Harmful to Share Views as a function of support of the ALM and BLM movements 
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are more likely to perceive the protester as having an ulterior motive to explain their 
reasoning for protesting.  
However, when participants supported the opposite viewpoint of the protester (i.e., a 
BLM supporting participant judging an ALM-supporting protester) the results were not so 
consistent. ALM supporters judging the BLM protester did not significantly differ in 
perception of an ulterior motive than the opponents of ALM (β1 = 0.066, t(211) = 1.889 , p = 
.06). Both opponents and supporters of ALM in this condition disagreed that the BLM-
supporting protester had an ulterior motive. However, BLM supporters thought that that the 
ALM-supporting protester had an ulterior motive for their actions significantly more than 
their opponents (β1 = 0.282 t(215) = 6.255, p < .001; see Table 4 and Figure 6). Thus, people 
who were not supportive of BLM did believed that the ALM-supporting protester had 
genuine reasons for their actions.  
Based on the initial hypotheses, it was predicted that perception of ulterior motives 
would be symmetrical, such that people the identify with either movement will perceive 
someone from the alternate movement to have ulterior motives. In this sample, though, it was 
mainly the BLM supporters who perceived hidden motives, and not the ALM supporters. 
This result is inconsistent with the idea that conservatives are more prone to motivated 
Note. On both axes, 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
Figure 6 
Belief in an Ulterior Motive as a function of support of the ALM and BLM movements 
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reasoning than liberals (Jost et al, 2003), and may possibly not generalize to other movements 
that liberals and conservatives have opposing views on. Further research would be required to 
make any such assessments.  
Table 4 
Comparison of marginal means for Ulterior Motive within supporters of ALM and BLM with 95%CI 
Participant identification 
Stance of 
Protester 1 SD Below Mean 
Mean Level of 
Support 1SD Above Mean 
a) Identifies with ALM  Pro-ALM 4.45 [4.26, 4.64] 3.28 [3.14, 3.42] 2.12 [1.92, 2.31] 
 Pro-BLM 2.10 [1.90, 2.30] 2.24 [2.11, 2.38] 2.39 [2.19, 2.58] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 2.73 [2.50, 2.96] 3.34 [3.17, 3.50] 3.94 [3.70, 4.18] 
  Pro-BLM 2.66 [2.41, 2.90] 2.27 [2.10, 2.43] 1.88 [1.65, 2.11] 
 
Agreement of Political Signaling. As predicted, when participants disagreed with the 
protester’s viewpoint, participants were more likely to believe that the protester was 
attempting to signal their political allegiance. Participants who had lower identification with 
the ALM movement agreed that the ALM-supporting protester was attempting to give a 
political signal, while supporters disagreed (β1 = -0.277, t(215) = -6.321, p < .001). Similarly, 
participants who had lower identification with the BLM movement also agreed that the BLM-
supporting protester was attempting to give a political signal (β1 = -0.234, t(211) = -4.843, p 
< .001, see Table 5 and Figure 7). Thus, people who disagree with either view were more 
likely to say that the protester is attempting to signal their political allegiance. 
Notably, this psychological bias was observed in participants that had opposing views 
with the protester. As predicted, when participants had a different viewpoint to the protester, 
participants indicated a greater level of agreement that the protester was attempting to signal 
their political allegiance. For example, participants with greater ALM identification, on 
average, indicated that the BLM-supporting protester was attempting to give a political signal 
in comparison to ALM opponents (β1 = 0.129, t(211) = 2.625, p = .009). Participants who had 
greater BLM identification also indicated that they thought the ALM-supporting protester 
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was giving a political signal, while opponents of the BLM movement disagreed (β1 = 0.240, 
t(215) = 5.257, p < .001; see Table 5 and Figure 7). Thus, people who endorsed one 
statement were more likely to think the protester with an opposing view was attempting to 








1 SD Below 
Mean 




a) Identifies with ALM  Pro-ALM 4.31 [4.04, 4.58] 3.71 [3.52, 3.91] 3.12 [2.84, 3.39] 
 Pro-BLM 3.31 [3.03, 3.59] 3.59 [3.39, 3.78] 3.86 [3.58, 4.14] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 3.24 [2.98, 3.51] 3.75 [3.56, 3.94] 4.26 [3.98, 4.54] 
  Pro-BLM 4.11 [3.82, 4.40] 3.62 [3.42, 3.81] 3.12 [2.85, 3.40] 
 
Negative Perceptions of the Protester. As predicted, when participants had a similar 
viewpoint to the protester, they viewed the protester more positively. For example, ALM 
supporters disagreed that the ALM-supporting protester was a dangerous or bad person while 
the ALM opponents agreed they were dangerous and bad (β1 = -0.377, t(215) = -14.283, p < 
.001). Moreover, BLM supporters indicated that the BLM-supporting protester was not 
dangerous or bad, while BLM opponents thought they were (β1 = -0.293, t(211) = -7.907, p < 
Figure 7  
Belief in Political Signaling as a function of support of the ALM and BLM movements 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
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.001; see Table 6 and Figure 8). Thus, people who disagree with either movement are likely 
to have negative perceptions of the supportive protester.  
When participants supported the opposite viewpoint of the protester (i.e., a BLM 
supporting participant judging an ALM-supporting protester) the relationship was not quite as 
clear as was predicted. While BLM supporters had a more negative perception of the ALM-
supporter than their opponents (β1= 0.227, t(215) = 6.649, p < .001), ALM supporters, 
judging the BLM-supporting protester, did not significantly differ in perception of the 
protester in  comparison to ALM-opponents (β1 = 0.089, t(211) = 2.417, p = .017). Thus, 
people who were not supportive of BLM were less likely to have negative perceptions of the 
ALM-supporting protester. 
Based on the initial hypotheses, it was predicted that negative perception of the 
protester would be symmetrical, such that people the identify with either movement will 
perceive someone from the alternate movement more negatively. In this sample, though, it 
was mainly the BLM supporters who held negative perceptions, and not the ALM supporters. 
This result is inconsistent with the idea that high in-group identification results in increased 
negative perception towards out-group members (Kelly, 1993). It would be interesting to 
further examine possible mechanisms behind this result as it may possibly be connected to 
the underlying reason of the formation of the two movements. As BLM was created as a 
response to the threat of violence towards black individuals by authority figures, BLM 
members may generally hold a greater initial negative perception towards anyone who 
appears to be attempting to reduce fair and equal treatment towards members of their ingroup 
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(Lebron, 2017). Whereas, the ALM movement formed as a response to BLM, and not based 
on any initial existing threat directed towards ALM in-group members.  
 
 
Support of censorship. As predicted, when participants had an opposing view to the 
protester, they were more likely to be supportive of censoring their protest. Participants who 
had greater identification with the ALM movement wanted less censorship of the ALM-
supporting protester (β1 = -0.201, t(215) = -7.296, p < .001), while similarly, participants who 
had greater identification with the BLM movement also wanted less censorship of the BLM-
supporting protester (β1 = -0.097 , t(211) = -3.116, p < .01, see Table 7 and Figure 9). Thus, 
people who disagree with either view are more likely to support censoring the protester. 
Table 6 




1 SD Below 
Mean 
Mean Level of 
Support 
1 SD Above 
Mean 
a) Identifies with ALM  Pro-ALM 3.67 [3.48, 3.85] 2.85 [2.72, 2.99] 2.04 [1.85, 2.23] 
 Pro-BLM 2.32 [2.13, 2.51] 2.51 [2.37, 2.64] 2.70 [2.51, 2.89] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 2.41 [2.22, 2.60] 2.89 [2.75, 3.03] 3.37 [3.17, 3.57] 
  Pro-BLM 
Figure 8 
Perception of Type of Person as a function of support of the ALM and BLM movements 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
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When participants had a different viewpoint to the protester, they were more 
supportive of censorship. For example, participants with greater ALM identification 
supported the censorship of the BLM-supporting protester to a greater extent than ALM 
opponents (β1 = 0.140, t(211) = 4.725, p < .001). Participants who had greater BLM 
identification were also more supportive of censoring the ALM-supporting protester than the 
opponents of BLM (β1 = 0.202, t(215) = 7.150, p < .001; see Table 3 and Figure 2). Thus, 
people who disagreed with one view were more likely to support censoring a supportive 
protester with an opposing view (i.e. low BLM identifying participants are more likely to 
support censoring a BLM-supporting protester). 
 The result that participants are more likely to support censorship when they have 
opposing views to the protester is proposed to be connected to the results mentioned above 
for each of the four other measures. When measuring the perception that it is harmful for the 
protester to share their view and that the protester is attempting to give a political signal, 
there is significant relationship across both conditions when the protester has an opposing 
view to the participants. Furthermore, when measuring negative perception of the protester 
and the perception that the protester has an ulterior motive, there are significant relationships 
when participants have opposing views when there is an ALM-supporting protester. When 
relating all the measures to the measure of censorship, this supports our initial hypothesis – 
when the participant believes the protester has an ulterior motive, may cause harm, is a bad 
person, and is attempting to give a political signal then support of censorship will be 
observed. This outcome is observed, fully, when assessing supporters of the BLM movement 
that are presented with a ALM-supporting protester, and partially observed when assessing 
supporters of the ALM movement that are presented with a BLM-supporting protester.  
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 Furthermore, the result that when participants had a similar view to the protester, they 
were less likely to support censorship, is also proposed to be related to the previously 
reported results of Study 2. Across both conditions for all four measures, the results ran as 
predicted. When participants were presented with a protester who shared their view point 
they were less likely to think that it was harmful for the protester to share their view, that they 
had an ulterior motive, that the protester was attempting to give a political signal, and that 
they were a bad person.  
Table 7 




1 SD Below 
Mean 
Mean Level of 
Support 1SD Above Mean 
a) Identifies with ALM  Pro-ALM 2.83 [2.66, 2.99] 2.40 [2.28, 2.52] 1.97 [1.80, 2.14] 
 Pro-BLM 1.74 [1.56, 1.91] 2.04 [1.92, 2.16] 2.34 [2.17, 2.51] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 2.00 [1.84, 2.17] 2.43 [2.30, 2.55] 2.85 [2.67, 3.02] 
  Pro-BLM 2.26 [2.08,2.44] 2.05 [1.93, 2.18] 1.85 [1.68, 2.02]  
 
Support of Potential Consequences for the Protester. Seven different possible 
reactions were posed to participants (the protester being sent to jail, getting fired from their 
job, getting beat up, be publicly shamed, have their views monitored by the government, 
given an award, and getting shown on the local news show) as response for protesting. As 
Figure 9 
Support of Censorship as a function of support of the ALM and BLM movements 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
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displayed in Table 7, across both conditions, without considering difference in identification 
to the movement, the most common response to any of the responses to the protester sharing 
their view was to strongly disagree the reaction.  
The only exceptions to this were that the most common response was to agree that the 
BLM-supporting protester should be shown on the local news, and participants most often 
only disagreed (appose to strongly disagreed) that the BLM-supporting protester should get 
an award. The response to the BLM-supporting protester being shown on the news, may not 
be very informative as in hindsight, the question posed to participants (“They should be on 
the local news?”) could have been interpreted as either in a positive light or a negative light. 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics of Reactions to Protester 






Shamed News Award 
Mean  ALM  1.52  1.64  1.58  2.34  2.18  2.63  2.15  
   BLM  1.54  1.55  1.53  2.27  1.73  3.15  2.75  
Median  ALM  1.00  1.00  1.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  2.00  
   BLM  1.00  1.00  1.00  2.00  1.00  3.00  3.00  
Mode  ALM  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
   BLM  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  4.00  2.00  
Standard 
deviation
 ALM  0.979  1.04  1.06  1.37  1.44  1.55  1.35  
   BLM  1.04  1.02  1.00  1.40  1.19  1.47  1.42  
However, when comparing level of support for the various reactions to the protesting 
by identification to the movement there were some notable difference between participants. 
Support Jailing the Protester. When assessing support of jailing the protester, there 
was not a significant difference in opinion when participants were viewing the protester who 
had a similar viewpoint to themselves. For example, there was not a significant difference in 
opinion between ALM supporters or opponents about whether the pro-ALM protester should 
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go to jail (β1 = -0.022, t(215) = -0.709, p = .479). Neither was there was not a significant 
difference in support to send the BLM-supporting protester to jail based on identification 
with the BLM movement (β1 = -0.054, t(211) = 1.559, p = .121; see Table 9 and Figure 10). 
As there was extremely little variation in level of support of jailing the protester across the 
whole sample (see Table 8), it is not surprising that there was not an observable difference. 
Thus, when people assess a protester who differ in opinion for an issue that is salient to them, 
they are not likely to support sending them to jail.  
As predicted, when participants had a different viewpoint to the protester, there was 
slight difference in support of sending them to jail. For example, when ALM supporting 
participants were presented with the BLM-supporting protester, there was a significant 
difference in support level to those that opposed the ALM movement (β1 = 0.125, t(211) = 
3.806, p < .001). Furthermore, BLM supporters judging the ALM-supporting protester were 
slightly more in support of sending the protester to jail than BLM opponents thought (β1 = 
0.114, t(215) = 3.801, p < .001). Thus, people who endorsed one view were more slightly 
more supportive of jailing the protester. However, as shown on Table 8, while the difference 
is significant on average response is between disagreeing with jailing the protester to strongly 
disagreeing.  
Table 9 






1 SD Below 
Mean 




a) Identifies with 
ALM Pro-ALM 1.57 [1.38, 1.75] 1.52 [1.39, 1.66] 1.48 [1.29, 1.66] 
 Pro-BLM 1.27 [1.08,1.46] 1.54 [1.40, 1.67] 1.81 [1.62, 2.00] 
b) Identifies with 
BLM Pro-ALM 1.30 [1.11, 1.48] 1.54 [1.40, 1.67] 1.78 [1.59, 1.97] 
  Pro-BLM 1.42 [1.23, 1.62] 1.54 [1.40, 1.67] 1.65 [1.46, 1.84] 
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Support of Getting the Protester Fired. When assessing support of firing the 
protester, within participants that shared viewpoints with the protester, the relationship was 
not quite as clear as was predicted. While participants that identified with the ALM 
movement disagreed that the ALM-supporting protester should be fired slightly less than 
those who did not identify with the movement (β1 = -0.086, t(215) = -2.727, p = .007), this 
was not seen when examining the BLM condition. There was not a significant difference in 
support to fire the BLM-supporting protester based on identification with the BLM 
movement (β1 = 0.010, t(211) = 0.298, p = .766; see Table 10 and Figure 11). Thus, people 
who disagree with ALM were more slightly more supportive of firing the protester. However, 
on average the response falls between strongly disagreeing and disagreeing to fire the 
protester (Table 10). 
As predicted, when participants had a differing viewpoint to the protester, there was 
slight difference in support of getting the protester fired for sharing their view. For example, 
when ALM supporting participants were presented with the BLM-supporting protester, there 
was a significant difference in support level to those that opposed the ALM movement, where 
participants who identified with the ALM movement we slightly more in favor of firing the 
protester then opponents of ALM (β1 = 0.145, t(211) = 4.543, p < .001; see Table 10 and 
Figure 10 
Support of sending the protester to jail as a function of support of the ALM and BLM 
movements 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
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Figure 11). Furthermore, BLM supporters judging the ALM-supporting protester showed 
slightly greater support to getting the protester fired than BLM opponents (β1 = 0.135, t(215) 
= 4.286, p < .001). Thus, people who endorsed one view were slightly more likely to support 
firing a protester with an opposing view. However, as shown on Table 10, while the 
difference is significant on average response is between disagreeing with firing the protester 
to strongly disagreeing. While there were significant differences observed within all 
conditions, overall no one was in support of firing the protester for publicly sharing their 
viewpoint.  
Table 10 
Comparison of marginal means for Support of Getting the Protester Fired within supporters of ALM and 
BLM with 95%CI 
Participant identification Stance of Protester 
1 SD Below 
Mean 




a) Identifies with ALM Pro-ALM 1.83 [1.64, 2.01] 1.64 [1.51,1.77] 1.45 [1.27, 1.64] 
 Pro-BLM 1.24 [1.04, 1.43] 1.55 [1.41, 1.68] 1.86 [1.67, 2.05] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 1.37 [1.19, 1.56] 1.66 [1.52, 1.79] 1.95 [1.75, 2.14] 





Support of getting the protester fired as a function of support of the ALM and BLM movements 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
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Support of Publicly Shaming the Protester. When assessing support of publicly 
shaming the protester, within participants that shared viewpoints with the protester, the 
relationship was not quite as clear as was predicted. While participants that identified with 
the ALM movement disagreed that the ALM-supporting protester should be publicly shamed 
slightly more than those who did not identify with the movement (β1 = -0.279, t(215) = -
6.881, p < .001), this was not seen when examining the BLM condition. There was not a 
significant difference in support to publicly shame the BLM-supporting protester based on 
identification with the BLM movement (β1 = 0.002, t(211) = 0.039, p = .969; see Table 11 
and Figure 12). Thus, people who disagree with ALM were more slightly more supportive of 
publicly shaming the ALM-supporting protester.  
As predicted, when participants had a differing viewpoint to the protester, there was 
slight difference in support of publicly shaming the protester for sharing their view. For 
example, when ALM supporting participants were slightly more in favour of publicly 
shaming the BLM-supporting protester, while participants that opposed the ALM movement 
did not support publicly shaming the protester (β1 = 0.154, t(211) = 4.105, p < .001; see 
Figure 12). Furthermore, BLM supporters judging the ALM-supporting protester showed 
greater support of publicly shaming the protester than BLM opponents (β1 = 0.292, t(215) = 
7.119, p < .001). Thus, people who endorsed one view were slightly more likely to support 
publicly shaming the protester with an opposing view. However, as shown on Table 11, while 
the difference is significant on average response is between somewhat disagreeing with firing 
the protester to strongly disagreeing. 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
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Table 11 
Comparison of marginal means for Support of Publicly Shaming the Protester within supporters of ALM 
and BLM with 95%CI 
Participant identification 
Stance of 
Protester 1 SD Below Mean 
Mean level of 
Support 1SD Above Mean 
a) Identifies with ALM Pro-ALM 2.77 [2.54, 3.00] 2.17 [2.00, 2.33] 1.57 [1.34, 1.80] 
 Pro-BLM 1.39 [1.15, 1.63] 1.72 [1.56, 1.89] 2.05 [1.82, 2.29] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 1.59 [1.36, 1.82] 2.21 [2.04, 2.38] 2.83 [2.59, 3.07] 
 Pro-BLM 1.72 [1.47, 1.97] 1.73 [1.56, 1.89] 1.73 [1.50, 1.96] 
 
Support of Monitoring the Views of the Protester. This relationship was not quite as 
clear when the participants were facing the protester that was sharing a similar viewpoint to 
themselves. While participants that did not identify with the ALM movement agreed that the 
protester should have their views monitored slightly more than those who did identify with 
the movement (β1 = -0.279, t(215) = -6.881, p < .001), this was not seen when examining the 
BLM condition. There was not a significant difference in support to monitor the views of the 
BLM-supporting protester based on identification with the BLM movement (β1 = -0.047, 
t(211) = -1.008, p = .315; see Table 12 and Figure 13). Thus, people who disagreed with the  
ALM movement were more slightly more supportive of monitoring the views of the BLM-
supporting protester. 
Figure 12 
Support of publicly shaming the protester as a function of support of the ALM and BLM movements 
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As predicted, when participants had a differing viewpoint to the protester, there was 
slight differences in support of getting the authorities to monitor the views of the BLM-
supporting protester. For example, ALM supporting participants were slightly more in favour 
of the authorities monitoring the views of the BLM-supporting protester, while participants 
that opposed the ALM movement were not supportive of this action (β1 = 0.154, t(211) = 
4.105, p < .001; see Figure 13). Furthermore, BLM supporters judging the ALM-supporting 
protester showed greater support of having the authorities monitor the views of the protester 
than BLM opponents (β1 = 0.201, t(215) = 4.917, p < .001). Thus, people who disagree with 
either view are more likely to support the authorities monitoring the views of the protester. 
However, again, it is important to note that while there is significant differences with the 
conditions, the average response fell between strongly disagreeing to monitoring views, to 
somewhat disagree, so on the whole, people are opposed to the authorities monitoring 
anyone’s views.  
Support of Showing the Protester on the Local News. As discussed above, how 
participants interpreted this question brings the interpretation of this question into dispute. In 
hindsight, the question should have been worded with less ambiguity (e.g. They should be on 
the local news to praise their actions?). However, the results obtained may still provide some 
Table 12 
Comparison of marginal means for Support of Monitoring the views of the Protester within supporters 




1 SD Below 
Mean 




a) Identifies with ALM Pro-ALM 2.47 [2.23, 2.72] 2.34 [2.16, 2.52] 2.21 [1.95, 2.46] 
 Pro-BLM 1.76 [1.50, 2.02] 2.27 [2.09, 2.45] 2.77 [2.51, 3.03] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 1.94 [1.69, 2.19] 2.37 [2.19, 2.55] 2.79 [2.53, 3.05] 
 Pro-BLM 2.38 [2.11, 2.65] 2.28 [2.10, 2.46] 2.18 [1.93, 2.43] 
Figure 13 
Support of monitoring the views of the protester as a function of support of the ALM and BLM movements 
 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
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insight. It was predicted that when participants had a differing viewpoint to the protester, 
participants would more strongly disagree that the protester should be shown on the local 
news – based on the theory that this was a positive reaction to the protester sharing their 
view.  
The results partially supported the predictions. when participants had a similar 
viewpoint to the protester, they more supportive of showing the protester on the local news. 
For example, ALM supporters were slightly more supportive of showing the ALM-
supporting protester on the local new than ALM opponents (β1 = 0.346, t(215) = 8.248, p < 
.001), and BLM supporters were also more supportive of showing the BLM-supporting 
protester on the news than BLM opponents (β1 = 0.283, t(211) = 6.263, p < .001; see Table 13 
and Figure 14). Thus, people who agree with either view are more likely to support the 
protester being shown on the local news.  
However, when participants supported the opposite viewpoint of the protester (i.e., a 
BLM supporting participant judging an ALM-supporting protester) there was not a 
significant difference in opinion to showing the protester on the news between people who 
identified with either the ALM or the BLM movement. ALM supporters judging the BLM-
Figure 14 
 Support of showing the protester on the local news as a function of support of the ALM and BLM 
movements 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
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supporting protester did not have a significant difference in view than ALM opponents (β1 = -
0.114, t(211) = -2.404 , p = .017). BLM supporters judging the ALM-supporting protester did 
not have a significant difference in view than BLM opponents thought (β1 = -0.019, t(215) = -
0.389, p = .698; see Table 13 and Figure 14). Thus, no one supports showing a protester from 
an opposing movement on the local news.  
Table 13 
Comparison of marginal means for Showing the protester on the local news within supporters of ALM and 




1 SD Below 
Mean 
Mean level of 
Support 1SD Above Mean 
a) Identifies with ALM Pro-ALM 1.89 [1.63, 2.15] 2.63 [2.45, 2.82] 3.38 [3.11, 3.64] 
 Pro-BLM 3.40 [3.13, 3.67] 3.15 [2.96, 3.34] 2.91 [2.64, 3.18] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 2.66 [2.40, 2.93] 2.62 [2.43, 2.82] 2.58 [2.30, 2.86] 
 Pro-BLM 2.52 [2.23, 2.81] 3.12 [2.92, 3.31] 3.71 [3.44, 3.99] 
 
Support of Giving the Protester and Award. The results supported the predictions 
that when participants agreed with the protester, they indicated greater agreement to giving 
the protester an award. For example, ALM supporters were slightly more supportive of 
giving the pro-ALM an award than the ALM opponents (β1 = 0.285, t(215) = 7.700, p < 
.001). Furthermore, BLM supporters were slightly more supportive of giving the pro-BLM an 
award than the BLM opponents said (β1 = 0.320, t(211) = 7.587, p < .001; see Table 13 and 
Figure 11). Thus, people that agree with either statement are more likely to support giving the 
protester an award as recognition for their actions.  
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However, when participants supported the opposite viewpoint of the protester (i.e., a 
BLM supporting participant judging an ALM-supporting protester) there was not a 
significant difference in viewpoint between identification towards neither the ALM nor the 
BLM movement. ALM supporters judging BLM protesters did not have a significant 
difference in view than ALM opponents towards giving the protester an award (β1 = -0.064, 
t(211) = -1.377, p = .170). BLM supporters judging the ALM-supporting protester did not 
have a significant difference in view than BLM opponents (β1 = 0.005, t(215) = 0.043, p = 
.906; see Table 14 and Figure 15). Thus, when people have opposing views to the protester, 
no one will support giving the protester an award.  
 
Table 14 




Protester 1 SD Below Mean 
Mean level of 
Support 1SD Above Mean 
a) Identifies with ALM Pro-ALM 1.54 [1.30, 1.79] 2.15 [1.98, 2.33] 2.77 [2.52, 3.01] 
 Pro-BLM 2.88 [2.63, 3.14] 2.75 [2.57, 2.92] 2.61 [2.36, 3.14] 
b) Identifies with BLM Pro-ALM 2.13 [1.89, 2.37] 2.15 [1.97, 2.33] 2.17 [1.92, 2.42] 
 Pro-BLM 2.03 [1.77, 2.29] 2.70 [2.53, 2.88] 3.38 [3.14, 3.63] 
Figure 15 
Support of giving the protester an award as a function of support of the ALM and BLM movements 
Note. On both axes 1 = Strongly Disagree – 6 = Strongly Agree 
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Full Model  
After analyzing each predictor of censorship individually, it was found that the 
perception that it is harmful for the protester to share their views and that the protester is 
attempting to give a political signal led to censorship in both conditions. However, perception 
that the protester had an ulterior motive and negative perception of the protester only led to 
censorship in one condition. Therefore, a model using all four predictors of censorship was 
tested, to compare the unique contributions of each predictor of censorship, over and above 
the other predictors. A regression analysis would allow us to asses which variables may have 
the greatest explanatory power in predicting censorship. The model was run four times, one 
for each condition and level of support for the two movements. The coefficients and 
significance levels of each model are displayed in Table 15.  
Perception of harm was a significant predictor (p < .01) for each model. This result 
suggests that no matter what your stance on the two movements is, when a person perceives a 
risk of harm through the action of protesting, everyone is more likely to support censoring the 
protester. The perception that the protester was a bad person was significant in all models, 
except for in the ALM condition model, for identification to the BLM movement (p = .015). 
Thus, suggesting that for participants who identify with the BLM movement, and are judging 
an ALM-supporting protester, if a negative perception is formed, this will not significantly 
increase the likelihood of supporting the censorship of the protester. Ulterior motive was only 
significant in one model, as shown in Table 15. Thus, suggesting that for participants who 
identify with ALM, when presented with a BLM-supporting protester, the perception that 
they have an ulterior motive will significantly increase their support of censorship. However, 
for the other conditions, perception that the protester has an ulterior motive will not 
significantly increase support of censorship.  
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Table 15 
Full Model Coefficients and Significance levels 











Pro-BLM ID with BLM .369 ** .241 ** .158  -.036 
Pro-BLM ID with ALM .266 ** .209  * .198 * -.062 
Pro-ALM ID with ALM .265 ** .239  * .129 .003 
Pro-ALM ID with BLM .226  * .197 .052 -.005 
Note. * p < .01 and ** p < .001 significance. 
The result that perception of political signaling was not significant in any of the 
models indicates that perceived political signaling does not influence whether a person is 
likely to support censorship or not. It is possible that this result is non-significant because 
there is already a high level of perceived partisanship association with the two movements 
(Democrats in support of BLM and Republicans ALM, as seen in Study 1). Thus, political 
partisanship may be easily implied based on an individual’s viewpoint. Which may also help 
explain why perception of an ulterior motive was only significant in one condition – because 
the apparent reasoning for supporting either movement is highly partisan, people do not need 
to form their own assumptions of members of the movements. If a small, unknown movement 
was being protested, this measure may possibly increase the significance as observers will 
have to form their own opinion, compared to using existing popular beliefs.   
The finding that all models included the significant measure that it is harmful to share 
their view followed the results observed when examining the measures individually. The 
finding that negative perception of the protester was significant in all models except one, also 
followed the previous results. However, the finding that the measure of ulterior motive was 
only a significant predictor of censorship with people identifying with the ALM movement, 
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when presented with the BLM-supporting protester, was surprising as this was the only 
condition that returned a non-significant finding when examining the measures individually. 
Furthermore, it was also surprising that perception of a political signal was not observed to be 
significant in any of the four full models, because when the measures were examined 
individually, it was significant in each condition. It should be noted that the any 
interpretations gained from should be viewed with slight caution as the tolerance factor was 
only slightly above .2 for some variables, thus indicating that there may be some shared 
explanatory power within the measures.  
Mediation Analyses 
Bootstrap analyses (1000 resamples) was used to test the mediation role of each 
dependent in explaining the relationship between identity and censorship. Correlations were 
first run between identity to ALM and BLM, and each of the five measures, to ensure the 
assumptions required to conduct mediation analysis were met. The correlation matrixes of 
participants in the ALM and BLM conditions is displayed in Appendix C and D respectively. 
Ulterior Motive. Ulterior motive was a significant mediator variable between ID with 
ALM and censorship of the ALM-supporting protester, and ID with BLM and censorship for 
the BLM-supporting protester. Thus, possibly acting as the psychological bias, favouring in-
group members. Belief in an ulterior motive partially mediated the relationship between ID 
with BLM and censorship of the ALM-supporting protester. But it did not act as a mediator 
between ID with ALM and censorship of the BLM-protester. The directions of the 
relationships followed our initial predications – when observing a protester that has opposing 
views to yourself, participants are generally more likely to believe that they must have an 
ulterior motive for being out protesting, and furthermore increased support of censorship.  
Belief that the ALM-supporting protester had an ulterior motive mediated the 
relationship between identification with ALM and censorship, as there was a significant 
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indirect path (z = -7.14, p < .001), and a non-significant direct path (z = 1.01, p = .313).  As 
identification with the ALM movement decreased, belief that the ALM-supporting protester 
had an ulterior motive increased (b = -0.541, SE = 0.030, p < .001), and in turn, the greater 
the belief that the protester had an ulterior motive, the higher the level of support of 
censorship (b = 0.438, SE = 0.054, p < .001).  
However, when examining the mediation effect of an ulterior motive only partially 
mediates the relationship between identification with BLM and censorship of the ALM-
supporting protester, as both the indirect and direct paths are significant (z = 5.03, p < .001; z 
= 3.43, p < .001 respectively). As identification with the BLM movement increased, belief 
that the ALM-supporting protester has an ulterior motive also increased (b = 0.286, SE = 
0.047, p < .001), and in turn, as belief in an ulterior motive increased, the greater the support 
of censorship (b = 0.335, SE = 0.045, p < .001). 
There was not significant evidence that belief that the BLM-supporting protester has 
an ulterior motive mediates support of censorship and identification with the ALM 
movement, as the indirect path is not significant (z = 1.82, p = .069).  However, this was not 
the case when examining whether belief in an ulterior motive mediates identification with the 
BLM movement and support of censorship of the BLM-supporting protester. There was a 
significant indirect path (z = -4.837, p < .001), and a non-significant direct path (z = 0.429, p 
= .668). As identification with the BLM movement decreased, belief that the BLM protester 
has an ulterior motive increased (b = -0.185, SE = 0.038, p < .001), and in turn, the greater 
the belief that the protester has an ulterior motive, the higher the level of support of 
censorship (b = 0.582, SE = 0.055, p <.001). 
Political Signal. Belief that the ALM-supporting protester was attempting to give a 
political signal partially mediated the relationship between identification with ALM and 
BLM and censorship. There was no significant mediation of belief that the BLM-supporting 
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protester was giving a political signal, between identification with BLM or ALM and 
censorship Thus, our predictions were only partially supported.  
Belief that the ALM-supporting protester was giving a political signal partially 
mediates the relationship between identification with ALM and censorship, as both the 
indirect and direct paths are significant (z = -2.74, p = .006; z = -4.89, p < .001 respectively).  
As identification with the ALM movement decreased, belief that the ALM-supporting 
protester was giving a political signal increased (b = -0.274, SE = 0.049, p < .001), and in 
turn, as belief in political signalling increased, the greater the support of censorship (b = 
0.157, SE = 0.049, p < .001) 
There was not significant evidence that belief that the pro-BLM protester was 
attempting to give a political signal mediated support of censorship and identification with 
neither the ALM nor the BLM movement, as the indirect path is not significant (z = 1.82, p = 
.069; z = 1.90, p =.058 respectively). 
When examining the mediation effect of belief that the ALM-supporting protester was 
attempting to signal their political allegiance by protesting, it was observed that it only 
partially mediated the relationship between identification with BLM and censorship, as both 
the indirect and direct paths were significant (z = 2.09 p = .004; z = 4.81, p < .001 
respectively). As identification with the BLM movement increased, belief that the ALM-
supporting protester is giving a political signal also increased (b = 0.236, SE = 0.047, p < 
.001), and in turn, as belief in political signalling increased, the greater the support of 
censorship (b = 0.171, SE = 0.048, p < .001). 
Negative Perception of Protester.  Negative perception of the ALM-supporting 
protester significantly mediated the relationship between ID with ALM and censorship, and 
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partially mediated the relationship between ID with BLM and censorship of the ALM-
supporting protester. Negative perception of the BLM-protester partially mediated the 
relationship between ID with the BLM movement and censorship. There was not significant 
evidence that negative perception meditated the relationship between ID with the ALM 
movement and censorship of the BLM-supporting protester. This supported our predictions.  
Negative perception of the ALM-supporting protester significantly mediated the 
relationship between identification with ALM and censorship, as there was a significant 
indirect path (z = -6.818, p < .001), and a non-significant direct path (z = 0.244, p = .807).  
As identification with the ALM movement decreased, negative perception of the ALM-
supporting protester increased (b = -0.377, SE = 0.029, p < .001), and in turn, the greater the 
negative perception of the protester, the higher the level of support of censorship (b = 0.553, 
SE = 0.065, p < .001).  
However, when examining the mediation effect of negative perception of the ALM-
supporting protester, it was found to only partially mediate the relationship between 
identification with BLM and censorship, as both the indirect and direct paths were significant 
(z = 5.70, p < .001; z = 3.18, p = .001 respectively). As identification with the BLM 
movement increased, negative perception of the ALM-supporting protester also increased (b 
= 0.236, SE = 0.033, p < .001), and in turn, as negative perception increased, the greater the 
support of censorship (b = 0.472, SE = 0.054, p < .001).  
There was not significant evidence that negative perception of the BLM-supporting 
protester mediated support of censorship and identification with the ALM movement, as the 
indirect path was not significant (z = 2.28, p = .022).  However, when examining the 
mediation effect of negative perception, it only partially mediates the relationship between 
identification with BLM and censorship of the BLM-supporting protester, as both the indirect 
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and direct paths were significant (z = -6.41, p < .001; z = 2.94, p = .003 respectively). As 
identification with the BLM movement increased, negative perception of the BLM-
supporting protester decreased (b = -0.263, SE = 0.038, p < .001), and in turn, as negative 
perception increased, the greater the support of censorship (b = 0.645, SE = 0.055,  p < .001). 
Harmful to Share Views. Belief that it was harmful for both the ALM and BLM-supporting 
protesters to share their views significantly mediated the relationship between identification 
with ALM and censorship. Belief that it could be harmful for both the ALM and BLM-
supporting protesters to share their views partially mediated the relationship between ID with 
the BLM movement and censorship. This partially supported our predictions.  
Perception of harm caused by the ALM-supporting protester sharing their view 
significantly mediated the relationship between identification with ALM and censorship, as 
there was a significant indirect path (z = -7.249, p < .001), and a non-significant direct path (z 
= 0.516, p = .606).  As identification with the ALM movement decreased, perception that it is 
harmful for the ALM protester to share their view increased (b = -0.476, SE = 0.035, p < 
.001), and in turn, the greater the perception that it is harmful for the protester to share their 
views, the higher the level of support of censorship (b = 0.446, SE = 0.050, p < .001).  
However, when examining the mediation effect of belief in harm caused by the ALM-
supporting protester sharing their view, only partially mediation in the relationship was 
observed between identification with BLM and censorship, as both the indirect and direct 
paths were significant (z = 5.84, p < .001; z = 3.36, p < .001 respectively). As identification 
with the BLM movement increased, belief that it is harmful for the ALM-supporting protester 
to share their view also increased (b = 0.293, SE = 0.043, p < .001), and in turn, as belief in 
harm increased, the greater the support of censorship (b = 0.395, SE = 0.036, p < .001). 
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Belief  that it is harmful for the protester to share their views mediates the relationship 
between identification with the ALM movement and censorship of the BLM-supporting 
protester, as there is a significant indirect path (z = 4.52, p < .001), and a non-significant 
direct path (z = 1.76, p = .078).  As identification with the ALM movement increases, belief 
that it is harmful for the BLM-supporting protester to share their view increases (b = 0.182, 
SE = 0.041, p < .001), and in turn, the greater the belief that it is harmful for the protester to 
share their view, the higher the level of support of censorship (b = 0.508, SE = 0.045, p < 
.001).  
However, when examining the mediation effect of belief of harm caused by the BLM-
supporting protester sharing their view, it only partially mediated the relationship between 
identification with BLM and censorship, as both the indirect and direct paths are significant 
(z = -6.72, p < .001; z = 3.86, p < .001 respectively). As identification with the BLM 
movement decreases, belief that it is harmful for the BLM-supporting protester to share their 
view increased (b = -0.313, SE = 0.040, p < .001), and in turn, as belief in potential harm 
increases, the greater the support of censorship (b = 0.605, SE = 0.041, p < .001).  
Discussion 
 The present study examines factors which affect a person’s likelihood of supporting 
censorship of a protester supporting either the ALM or BLM movement. The overall finding 
was that people’s support for censorship depended on their own political values. Notably, 
participants who opposed the protester’s view were more likely to think that the protester 
could cause harm by sharing their view, was attempting to signal their political allegiance, 
had an ulterior motive for their actions (for participants that identified with BLM, but the 
protester supported ALM), was a dangerous and bad person, and supported censoring them.  
Moreover, perception of harm, negative perception, belief of political signaling, and belief of 
an ulterior motive, either fully or partially mediated support of censorship.  
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 This study also explored people’s support for several other consequences for the 
protester. People were generally unsupportive of each of the seven potential consequences, 
however, there were differences observed based on statement support. When participants 
opposed the protester’s viewpoint, regardless of whether they were in support of BLM or 
ALM, increased support was observed for jailing, firing, monitoring their views, beating 
them up, and publicly shaming the protester, in comparison to supporters of the protester’s 
viewpoint. When participants shared the protester’s viewpoint, regardless of whether they 
were in support of BLM or ALM, decreased support of beating them up and increased 
support of giving them an award and showing them on the local news was observed. When 
participants had greater identification with the ALM movement, when they shared views with 
the protester, they opposed firing the protester or having their views monitored, but if they 
disagreed with the protesters, they did not support them going on the local news. When 
participants identified with the BLM movement, they did not support publicly shaming the 
protester when they shared viewpoints. 
General Discussion 
Interactions between Level of Identification and Measure Support 
 As observed in Study 1, for people that support the either movement, they were more 
likely to believe that the statement was equal to a rephrased, non-political statement (H2). 
This belief may help explain the results that were observed when measuring perception of 
harm and negative perception of the protester. Regardless of whether a person supports ALM 
or BLM, if they hold the belief that the cause is hoping to create justice and fairness to 
whichever group of people, if someone opposes the movement, then that undermines the 
perception of good that the movement is trying to bring about. Thus, in the wider sense, 
opposition to the movement could be perceived as a barrier to equality and justice in society.  
61 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
 This finding challenges the ideas of Jost et al., (2003), who observed that 
conservatives are particularly motivated (more so than liberals). Jost et al., theorized that the 
motivational reasoning observed in conservatives is centered around core ideological 
foundations of conservatism; key factors being resistance to stress and justification of 
inequality. While Jost and colleagues (2003) finding may be true generally, evidence to 
support this claim was not seen in our data. Instead, it was found that both liberals and 
conservatives were motivated to censor their opponents’ views. Indeed, there was some 
evidence that BLM supporters were more censorious than ALM supporters were. 
The support of perception of the political statement acting as a political signal (H3), 
was somewhat replicated in Study 2, when participants were asked whether they thought the 
protester was sharing their view to signal their political allegiance. Similarly to Study 1, 
participants that shared the same view as the protester did not believe that the protester was 
attempting to signal their political allegiance. Whereas participants that did not share their 
viewpoint with the protester were significantly more likely to believe that they were more 
attempting to signal their political allegiance. This further supports the hypothesis that 
partisanship is a significant factor surrounding the two movements, and that the statements 
act as dog-whistles. As previously mentioned, dog-whistle statements are only seen as 
political signals when viewed from an opposing viewpoint, as people are less likely to believe 
that a statement, they support has negative connotations surrounding it (Hanley-López, 2015).  
When a protester had a similar viewpoint to the protester, they believed that the 
protester was more likely to have a genuine reason for protesting. Regardless of which 
movement the participant was identified with. The belief that a like-minded protester is acting 
with genuine reasoning may be in part explained by confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). If a 
person has high identification to a cause, when they encounter a person who is publicly 
sharing their shared viewpoint, the confirmation bias affirms that the protester is protesting 
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for similar genuine reasons as one individually holds to explain their own identification to the 
cause. The finding that people are more likely to believe a person or protester that has 
opposing views to oneself is giving a political signal by sharing their viewpoint adds to the 
current literature of dog-whistle politics. It expands the current literature (e.g., Haney-López, 
2015; Wetts & Willer), from looking specifically at statements used in politics, to wider 
socio-political movements.  
It is important to note that for each condition, level of identification with the 
movement directly related to level of support of censorship towards the protester. Thus, 
indicating that no matter where someone stands on the spectrum on support for ALM or 
BLM, when you encounter a person with opposing views to yourself, you are more likely to 
support censorship. It was extremely surprising to observe that participants who identified 
with BLM reported the highest response of censorship against the ALM-supporting protester 
(see Table 7), albeit, when interpreting the mean response, it was still only somewhat 
disagreeing to censor the ALM protester. Although, as previously noted, the result that 
participants who had high identity with BLM were more likely to support censorship of the 
ALM protester, and less likely to support a BLM supporting protester, may be related to why 
the movement started in the first place. The acts that were occurring against black Americans, 
primarily by white Americans in positions of authority (Lebron, 2017), posed a threat to 
overall safety and wellbeing of people of color across the U.S.A. Thus, when a protester is 
supporting a cause that is perceived to be championing for against the BLM movement, it 
may elicit stronger reactions in comparison to an ALM supporter seeing a BLM protester.  
Support of Possible Consequences for Protesting 
 When examining support towards possible consequences that the protester could face 
for sharing their views, the results were not quite so conclusive. While there were significant 
differences observed across all seven of the proposed possible consequences, for at least two 
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of the four conditions, when examining the average stated level of support for the 
consequences, participants across the sample disagreed with all consequences. Thus, the 
results did not add support to the claim that people would be more willing to censor when 
they disagree with the protester (H4). 
This result that few people were supportive of any of the possible direct 
consequences, was quite surprising but may possibly be related to the scenario that was posed 
to participants. The scenario was purposely written to reflect a situation in which a protester 
was clearly demonstrating their viewpoint to get attention for their cause, but not an extreme 
or disruptive manner. When examining perception of extreme protesters, Feinberg et al., 
(2020) found that overall perception of the movement that the protesters were acting in the 
name of, decreased with extreme acts, while Giersch (2019) reported that support of 
punishing campus protesters was reported by both conservatives and liberal students. Neither 
studies examined support of specific consequences to the protesters. By including questions 
which specifically asked about potential consequences for the protester, this helps to fill a gap 
in the current literature, as there is little research which includes this specific component. To 
examine if there is a difference in support of possible consequences, the in another condition 
could be added where the protester was causing a more extreme protest (such as blocking a 
highway, as was used in the Feinberg et al., (2019) study). In both scenarios the cause that is 
being protested could be constant to examine if severity of protest moderated the relationship 
between support of cause and support of consequence. 
However, it should be noted that the measure of censorship is also a potential 
consequence in its own standing, and support of censorship was observed across the four 
conditions. It is interesting that people appear supportive of the concept of censorship, but 
when given the choice of specific actions, support diminishes. This may be related to 
psychological distancing (Fisher & Manstead, 2016). When asked about general support of 
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censorship, participants may be able to respond, with the frame of mind that they are not 
directly performing the act, so they can distance themselves from any possible outcome. 
However, when directly asked about specific potential consequences, the distance is reduced, 
and participants become unwilling to support the specific acts. 
Theoretical Model to Predict Censorship 
 The initial analysis was concerned with examining how each measure or consequence 
acted individually within each condition. To examine whether belief that it was harmful for 
the protester to share their views, negative perception, belief of an ulterior motive, and belief 
of political signaling were significant predictors of censorship, a linear regression was 
applied. The perception that it is harmful for the protester to share their view was significant 
in all models, as was negative perception of the protester (except for the condition with an 
ALM protester and identification with BLM). Ulterior motive was a significant predictor of 
censorship for the condition with a BLM protester and participants gave level of 
identification to ALM, but for no other model. And political signal was not significant in any 
of the models. These results give partial support to the hypothesis that willingness to support 
censorship will increase when they perceive the protester negatively, when the think they 
might be harmful, if they have an ulterior motive, and when they think they are giving a 
political signal (H4).  
It was interesting to find that despite significant findings in both Study 1 and when 
examining the individual measures of in Study 2, belief that the protester is attempting to 
signal their political allegiance was not a significant predictor of censorship. As previously 
noted, as the two movements are highly partisan, people may be able to assume one’s 
political standing based on which statement is supported. However, the fact that there is a 
high perception of political signal associated with sharing one’s viewpoint, as seen in this 
analysis, this does not necessarily mean that people believe it is a strong enough reason to 
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alter support of censorship. People may be able to make a reasonable assumption of their 
political standing based on their viewpoint, but this is not enough to censor- just giving a 
signal does not necessarily present a risk. The addition of perception of harm, negative 
perception, and an ulterior motive are more significant factors. The direct influence of 
political signaling on censorship is examined further in the analysis through a mediation 
study.  
Similarly, it was surprising that perception of an ulterior motive was only a significant 
predictor of censorship in one condition. Similar to the non-significant influence of political 
signaling, perception of an ulterior motive, alone, may not indicate possible risk. As observed 
when analyzing the individual measures, the perception of an ulterior motive significantly 
increased when participants who identified with the BLM movement saw an ALM-
supporting protester and decreased when participants saw a protester who had a similar 
viewpoint to themselves. However, when considering whether to censor the protester, people 
may need additional information (i.e. does the perceived ulterior motive increase the risk that 
I may be exposed to?) for perception of an ulterior motive to be serious enough threat to 
censor. In instances of short interaction, people exhibit the truth bias, which is bias to judge 
statements as truthful, until given information to the contrary (Masip et al., 2009). If there is 
no supporting information to strengthen suspicion of the perceived ulterior motive, then 
people are likely to trust the protester at face value.  
Mediating Influences on Censorship  
When people shared viewpoints with the protester, the perception of an ulterior 
motive fully mediated the relationship between identification and support of censorship. 
Thus, indicating that when people have no reason to believe the protester has an ulterior 
motive, there would be no support of censorship. However, when people who identify with 
the BLM movement saw the ALM-supporting protester this relationship was only partially 
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mediated, thus indicting that the relationship between identification and censorship would 
still be present regardless of the belief of an ulterior motive. This supports the hypothesis that 
people will more willing to support censorship when they think the protester has an ulterior 
motive (H5). The full mediation observed may be explained by in-group biases (Mullen et al., 
1992). People tend to view in-group members more favorably, thus, unless extra information 
is given to arise suspicion of an ulterior motive, the in-group bias would reduce the likelihood 
perception of harm to be made present.  
 For people that highly identify with the ALM movement, perception of harm fully 
mediated the relationship between identification and support of censorship. This was 
regardless of whether they shared views with the protester or not. For people that highly 
identify with the BLM movement, perception of harm partially mediated the relationship 
between identification and support of censorship, regardless of whether they shared views 
with the protester. Thus, indicating that the relationship between identification and censorship 
would still be present regardless of perception of harm. Thus, supporting the hypothesis that 
people are more supportive of censorship when they perceive the protester to be harmful 
(H5). 
 For people who identified with the BLM movement, negative perception of the 
protester partially mediated the relationship between identification and support of censorship 
thus indicting that the relationship between identification and censorship would still be 
present regardless of the belief of negative perception, thus supporting the initial hypotheses 
(H5). However, when people who identify with the ALM movement saw an ALM-supporting 
protester this relationship was fully mediated, Thus, indicating that when people positively 
perceptive the protester, there would be no support of censorship.  
A 2016 Pew Research Centre study reported that people held extremely negative 
perceptions toward members of the opposing party, in both Republicans and Democrats. The 
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study reported that it was the first time since the beginning of their surveying that both parties 
expressed very unfavorable views towards one another. Approximately half of Republican 
and Democrats reported that the opposing party made them feel “afraid”, and this was even 
more heightened in highly partisan respondents (Pew Research Centre, 2016). This finding 
may influence the observed result that perception of harm and negative perception of the 
protester mediated the relationship between level of identification with the ALM or BLM 
movements and censorship.  
 When people see an ALM-supporting protester, belief that the protester is attempting 
to give a political signal partially mediates the relationship between identification to either 
movement and support of censorship. However, there was no mediation of political signaling 
when there was a BLM-supporting protester. Thus, giving partial support to the hypothesis 
that people will be more willing to support censorship when they perceive the protester as 
giving a political signal (H5). It is interesting that there was not a strong mediation effect 
observed with this measure. This may be related to the public perception of why the two 
movements exist. As the BLM movement has gained a lot of traction and awareness within 
the general public sphere, people may be more certain that they know why the movement 
exists (Horowitz & Livingston, 2016), whereas for the ALM movement, people may need to 
make their own assumptions, thus political associations may be formed.  
The partial and full mediation that was observed may be related to the Justification-
Suppression Model. The Justification-Suppression Model (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) aims 
to explain the processes that lead to the expression and actions of a person’s individual 
prejudice. Typically, a person can suppress their prejudices, until some form of justification is 
present, which enables a person to display their underlying prejudices in an explainable, and 
possibly socially acceptable way. For many people, for people that are high in identification 
towards ALM or BLM, the instance in which they observe a protester who is publicly sharing 
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a viewpoint that opposes their view, the act of censorship becomes psychologically 
justifiable. This may mean that while in any other circumstances a person may be more than 
content with ignoring a protester, if they are not attacking an identifying factor.  However, the 
mediation of perception of harm, negative perception of the protester, belief that they have an 
ulterior motive and are attempting to signal their political allegiance acts as justification to 
censor the protester.  
Practical and Theoretical Implications  
 The concept of censorship is not a new phenomenon. It would be foolish to imagine 
that any increased insight gained from this study will resolve the issue of censorship, but it 
may add another layer of understanding to the struggle against it. Furthermore, there are 
many more areas of censorship than the area of individual censorship of another person that 
is explored in the current study, but by increasing awareness of what an individual can be 
aware of in their own actions and thoughts may provide a small step closer to change on a 
greater scale.  
Due to the strength of support and reaction that the movements have gotten on social 
media, research examining various facets of the Black Lives Matter and All Lives Matter 
movements have been gaining traction over the past years, since the formation of the 
movements. A range of areas have been the focus of research such as the role of color-
blindness (e.g., Atkins, 2019), the formation of the movements (e.g., Rickford, 2016), 
singling out how they differ in online discussion (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2018), to how the 
movements are viewed (e.g., Horowitz & Livingston, 2016). Despite this growing interest, 
the area of censorship towards these movement has been largely untouched, despite specific 
instances of censorship occurring (e.g., “School’s censorship of Black Lives Matter posters 
violate free speech, ACLU says”, 2019). This current study starts the attempt of filling the 
gap the current BLM and ALM literature of censorship.  
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When examining the process of suspicion of an ulterior motive Marchand and Vonk 
(2005) found that upon receiving information, people readily suspect the presence of an 
ulterior motive. In Marchand and Vonk’s experiment, participants were presented with a cue 
that varied in degree of information about the hypothetical scenario. When participants were 
given more negative information on behavior, suspicion of an ulterior motive increased. 
Similar findings were also reported in an earlier study, which reported that people were 
quicker to suspect an ulterior motive of a negative action, than of positive actions (Vonk & 
Van Knippenberg, 1994). The present study adds to this literature, by removing given cues. 
Perception of an ulterior motive was generated based on existing perceptions and stereotypes 
of BLM or ALM protesters. The scenario was specifically written to avoid providing 
participants with any particularly negative or positive information, to avoid any priming 
effects of attitude. This work is particularly relevant to connect with normative and non-
normative collective action work (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011), as it elaborates on how people 
may perceive protesters. In relation to Marchand and Vonk (2005) and Vonk and Van 
Kippenberg (1994) studies, if the protester provides any further information which may shed 
them in a negative light, people may be more likely to believe that they have an ulterior 
motive for the action, and would be exacerbated if the protester already was perceived 
negatively.  
The present study adds to the current literature on attitudes of censorship towards 
others and adds a specific focus using ALM and BLM movements. It was observed that while 
we were able to generate a model which included factors which significantly predicted 
support of censorship, overall, people were not supportive of the potential censoring 
consequences that were posed as possible reactions to the ALM or BLM-supporting protester. 
This result varied from what was predicted, as it was thought that participants that disagreed 
with the protester would at least support censorship to some degree. However, there were still 
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significant differences between the conditions, and identification did significantly predict 
support of censorship in both movements.  
Limitations  
When examining factors that make statements more believable and trustworthy for 
readers, Rho (2019) notes that it is possible that the inclusion of the hashtag to a statement 
makes the statement more partisan. This could be a possible extension for Study 1. Due to the 
magnitude of the discussion that occurs online, this could be an interesting avenue to explore. 
If an extra condition was included, which had the political statements written out with a 
hashtag (e.g. #BlackLivesMatter or #BLM), it would be interesting to see if there was a 
difference in support between the hashtag and non-hashtag statement. By including a hashtag 
condition, it may possibly strengthen support of the three hypotheses that were tested, due to 
possibly making partisanship a more salient factor to center-left and far-right participants 
(Faris et al., 2017).  
The difference between concrete and abstract scenarios may pose a significant change 
to the observed results of the present study. As seen in a UK study which examined 
university student’s support of free speech (Simpson & Kaufmann, 2019), participants 
indicated that they supported free speech in hypothetical scenarios, but when given examples 
of real world instances were either a speaker was denied or given the chance to discuss a 
relatively controversial topic, they were less supportive of free speech, in the examples where 
the speaker was denied the chance to speak. It is possible that the participants in this study 
were rationalising the outcome of whether the speakers were denied or accepted to give their 
speech base. For example, when the participants had to decide whether to support the actions 
of the universities, they may have excused the university if they think the university would 
only have acted in such a way, if they had sound moral reasoning for doing so. This would an 
interesting factor to consider in the present study as it may exacerbate the results. As some 
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agreement was observed towards the opposing protester, in a concrete situation, support for 
censorship may possibly increase, following the Simpson and Kaufmann (2019) results. 
A possible extension to the study to address this limitation would be to attempt to 
replicate the hypothetical scenario posed in Study 2, in a concrete real-life scenario. It is one 
thing for someone to say that they support a certain act or view when they are safely sitting 
behind their computer screen and answering a multichoice survey, that really, will not affect 
themselves from the moment they complete the survey. And their responses do not have a 
direct effect on another person. However, if an actor was able to pose as a protester and the 
participants were able to actively engage with the protester or be able to influence some sort 
of action against them it would be interesting to see if the current results would replicate. 
As this study only uses participants from the U.S.A., the results and conclusions 
formed form this study may not be generalisable to other populations. Further studies would 
have to be conducted to be able to say conclusively whether the trends observed in the 
present study relate in other settings. Partisanship is a salient factor in many different 
cultures, so while the direct example of ALM and BLM may not be relevant, given there is a 
similar dog-whistle statement in use in a political sphere, it would be expected that the results 
would replicate. None of the questions posed, aside from the specific use of ALM and BLM, 
were written with the intention to be specific to Americans, thus they may be acceptable to 
use directly.  
A further limitation of the present study, is that the possible censoring consequences 
that were posed to participants, may not mimic the extent of censorship that people perceive 
to be happening, if at all, around them. It may have been beneficial to run a pre-test to 
examine which acts of censorship people believe occur already, and which they believe may 
be appropriate for a given scenario. Furthermore, while the study was interested in 
identifying factors that predicted an individual’s support of censorship, and various 
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consequences, it could be interesting to examine whether people differ in support if they are 
posed as being the person responsible for the action of censoring, versus altering an outside 
body, such as the FBI to the protesters actions, which resulted in censorship. This would have 
to posed as a hypothetical scenario, as there would be some ethical concerns, like those raised 
after the infamous Milgram Experiment (Milgram, 1963).  
Future Directions  
 One possible future extension of the current study could be to artificially create an 
environment in which censoring may occur. For example, two group of participants could be 
randomly created in a lab and posed to have opposing views to one another. rts whichever 
side of the argument they hold. Initially the participants will be able to mingle and get to 
know the members of their group, promoting an in-group mentality, and are able to promote 
their stance on a certain topic. Then participants could be told to engage in a debate or 
discussion where they are able to share and discuss their views on the particular topic which 
differentiates them. After the debate, participants would be presented with a similar 
questionnaire as was given in Study 1 and 2 of the present study but rephrased to reflect the 
real situation they have been placed in in the lab. It would be interesting to see if the 
interaction between the two groups would elicit increased censoring support towards the 
opposing group. Furthermore, Hanley-López (2017) reflects, that the only way to reduce the 
biases that are drawn from the interpretation of a dog-whistle statement is to self-reflect on 
the statement, and the associations that were drawn from it. Thus, in a debate setting it would 
allow participants to reflect on their initial assumptions made towards the out-group, and 
possibly reach alternate conclusions if given the chance. 
Another possible extension to the study, would be to replicate the current studies with 
a couple of different other social movements, for example, climate change activists against 
climate change deniers. Both sides still elicit a partisan reaction – Republicans erring on the 
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side of denial, while activists are typically on the Democratic side. This would enable to 
external validity of the study to be scrutinized. If the trends that are observed in the current 
study are held constant across different contexts, this could enable more public awareness of 
what thoughts and actions may precipitate censorship towards others. Awareness may enable 
people to react and assess their thoughts and behaviors before outwardly acting, if they want 
to reduce the chance of censoring someone unintentionally.  
An interesting addition the present model may have been to include degree of moral 
conviction people feel surrounding BLM and ALM, as this may have been a possible 
influential factor behind the observed support of censorship. Degree of moral conviction was 
defined as “a strong and absolute stances on moral issues (e.g., Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 
2005; Tetlock, 2002; Turiel, 1983), as important energisers of collective action” (Van 
Zomwewn, 2012, p. 52). Van Zomeren et al., (2012) reported that the degree of moral 
conviction significantly predicted collective action and the intention to act. Furthermore, 
political identification was identified as a possible factor in Van Zomeren and colleague’s 
model of collective action, which may connect the observed results of support of censorship 
and the support of H1. 
To extend the present study’s findings surrounding factors that influence censorship 
of others, a further study is intended to be conducted which examines factors which may 
affect self-censorship when discussing ALM or BLM. Participants will first indicate their 
support or opposition to Black lives matter (BLM) and All lives matter (ALM). We are 
testing how people react in their everyday lives when they are put in the situation of sharing 
their own attitudes towards ALM or BLM. Specifically, what factors contribute to a person 
censoring their own speech. It would be hypothesized that people who believe they will be 
viewed negatively if they share their viewpoint will have greater levels of self-censorship. 
Furthermore, people who think their views will be perceived as stemming from an ulterior 
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motive will self-censor more. People who think their friends will take negative actions 
against them if they speak will self-censor more. People who think their friends will view 
their viewpoint as harmful will self-censor more. People who think their friends will view 
them as giving a political signal will self-censor more. People who think their friends will try 
to censor them for sharing their view will self-censor more. Furthermore, levels of self-
censorship will also be predicted by perceived level of support in the American public (e.g., if 
there is perceived high levels of support for BLM in the American public, and the participant 
does support BLM, there will be low levels of self-censorship). 
Conclusion   
 This research attempted to explore some of psychological biases and salient factors 
that affect censorship behavior towards a protester who supported either the All Lives Matter 
or Black Lives Matter movements. It was observed that support of ALM and BLM was 
highly partisan, that when people support either statement they are more likely to believe that 
the political statement is equivalent to a rephrased, non-politicised version of the statement, 
and that by sharing their view on the statement they are not attempting to signal their political 
allegiance. On average, participants who disagreed with the political statement and did not 
identify with the movement were more likely to indicate that they would be in support of 
censorship towards a protester who agreed with the movement and statement, in comparison 
to participants that agreed with the protesters statement and movement. There was partial 
support to suggest that participants were more supportive of censorship when they believed 
the protester had an ulterior motive, when they thought the statement was a political signal, 
when they had negative perceptions of the protester, and when they thought sharing the view 
would be harmful. However, there was not significant support of potential consequences for 
the protester. Overall, the present study adds to the growing literature, providing insight into 
factors which influence support of censoring others and how identification towards a social 
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cause effects perception of non-extreme protesters. Awareness of what factors accentuate 
censorship and perception of others may enable growth on a personal level and improved 
social perception of collectivist groups.  
  
76 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
References 
Anderson, M., Toor S., Rainie, L., & Smith, A. (2018). Activism in a Social Media Age. Pew 
 Research Center, 11. Retrieved from 
 https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/07/11/activism-in-the-social-media-age/ 
Andrews, K. T., Caren, N., & Browne, A. (2018). Protesting trump. Mobilization: An 
 International Quarterly, 23(4), 393-400. 
Assembly, U. G. (1948). Universal declaration of human rights. UN General 
 Assembly, 302(2). 
Atkins, A. (2019). Black lives matter or all lives matter? Color-blindness and epistemic 
  injustice. Social Epistemology, 33(1), 1-22. Doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.
 2018.1483879 
Bennett-Swanson, M. (2017). Media Coverage of Black Lives Matter. Critique. Illinois State. 
Cains, E (1982) Intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland. In Tajfel, H. (1st Ed.). Social identity
  and intergroup relations (pp. 277-297). Cambridge University Press; Editions de la 
 Maison des Sciences de l’Hommes. 
Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression 
 and experience of prejudice. Psychological bulletin, 129(3), 414.doi: 10.2037/0033-
 2909.129.3.414 
Ethier, K. A., & Deaux, K. (1994). Negotiating social identity when contexts change: 
 Maintaining identification and responding to threat. Journal of personality and social 
 psychology, 67(2), 243. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.243. 
Faris, R., Roberts, H., Etling, B., Bourassa, N., Zuckerman, E., & Benkler, Y. (2017).  
 Partisanship, propaganda, and disinformation: Online media and the 2016 US 
  presidential election. Berkman Klein Center Research Publication, 6. 
77 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Feinberg, M., Willer, R., & Kovacheff, C. (2020). The activist’s dilemma: Extreme protest 
 actions reduce popular support for social movements. Journal of Personality and 
 Social Psychology. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000230 
Fischer, A. H., & Manstead, A. S. (2016). Social functions of emotion and emotion 
 regulation. In Lewis, M. Haviland-Jones, J. & Barrett, L.F (4th Ed.) Handbook of 
  emotions, (pp. 424-439). Gilford. 
Gallagher, R. J., Reagan, A. J., Danforth, C. M., & Dodds, P. S. (2018). Divergent discourse 
 between protests and counter-protests:# BlackLivesMatter and# AllLivesMatter. PloS 
 one, 13(4). doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0195644 
Giersch, J. (2019). Punishing campus protesters based on ideology. Research & Politics, 6(4), 
 2053168019892129.doi: 10.1177/2053168019892129 
Haney-López, I. (2015). Dog whistle politics: How coded racial appeals have reinvented 
 racism and wrecked the middle class. Oxford University Press. 
Haslam, S. A., & Reicher, S. (2006). Stressing the group: social identity and the unfolding 
 dynamics of responses to stress. Journal of applied psychology, 91(5), 1037. doi: 
 10.1037/0021-9010.91.5.1037 
Hayes, A. F., Scheufele, D. A., & Huge, M. E. (2006). Nonparticipation as self-censorship: 
 Publicly observable political activity in a polarized opinion climate. Political 
 Behavior, 28(3), 259-283. doi: 10.1007/s11109-006-9008-3 
Horowitz, J. M., & Livingston, G. (2016). How Americans view the Black Lives Matter 
 movement. Pew Research Center, 8. 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as 
 motivated social cognition. Psychological bulletin, 129(3), 339. doi: 
 10.1037/0033.129.3.339 
78 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Kelly, C. (1993). Group identification, intergroup perceptions and collective
 action. European review of social psychology, 4(1), 59-83. doi: 
 https://doi.org/10.1080/14792779343000022 
Knobe, J. (2003a). Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis, 63(3), 
 190-194. 
Knobe, J. (2003b). Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental 
 investigation. Philosophical psychology, 16(2), 309-324.doi: 
 10.1080/09515080307771 
Kwon, K. H., Moon, S. I., & Stefanone, M. A. (2015). Unspeaking on Facebook? Testing 
 network effects on self-censorship of political expressions in social network 
 sites. Quality & Quantity, 49(4), 1417-1435. 
Labovitz, S. (1968). Criteria for selecting a significance level: A note on the sacredness of. 
 05. The American Sociologist, 220-222. 
Lebron, C. J. (2017). The making of black lives matter: A brief history of an idea. Oxford 
 University Press. 
Levine, M., Prosser, A., Evans, D., & Reicher, S. (2005). Identity and emergency 
 intervention: How social group membership and inclusiveness of group boundaries 
 shape helping behavior. Personality and social psychology bulletin, 31(4), 443-453. 
 doi: 10.1177/0146167204271651 
Marchand, M. A., & Vonk, R. (2005). The process of becoming suspicious of ulterior 
 motives. Social Cognition, 23(3), 242-256. 
Marques, J. M., & Paez, D. (1994). The ‘black sheep effect’: Social categorization, rejection
  of ingroup deviates, and perception of group variability. European review of social
  psychology, 5(1), 37-68. doi: 10.1080/1472779543000011 
79 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Masip, J., Garrido, E., & Herrero, C. (2009). Heuristic versus systematic processing of 
 information in detecting deception: Questioning the truth bias. Psychological 
 Reports, 105(1), 11-36. 
Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. The Journal of abnormal and social 
 psychology, 67(4), 371. doi: 10.2466/PR0.105.1.11-36 
Mullen, B., Brown, R., & Smith, C. (1992). Ingroup bias as a function of salience, relevance, 
 and status: An integration. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22(2), 103-122. 
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many 
 guises. Review of general psychology, 2(2), 175-220.  
Papacharissi, Z. (2004). Democracy online: Civility, politeness, and the democratic potential 
 of online political discussion groups. New media & society, 6(2), 259-283. doi
 10.1177/1461444804041444 
Parker, K., Morin, R., & Horowitz, J. M. (2019). Looking to the future, public sees an 
 America in decline on many fronts. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from 
 https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/03/21/public-sees-an-america-in-decline-on-
 many-fronts/ 
Pew Research Centre (2016, June 22). Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016: Highly 
 negative views of the opposing party – and its members. Retrieved from: 
 https://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-
 2016/ 
Rankin, J. (2018, August 07). Massey University bans Don Brash from speaking.  Retrieved
  from https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/106068816/massey-university-bans-don-brash-
 from-speaking 
80 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Reeder, G. D., Pryor, J. B., Wohl, M. J., & Griswell, M. L. (2005). On attributing negative 
 motives to others who disagree with our opinions. Personality and Social Psychology
  Bulletin, 31(11), 1498-1510. doi: 10.1177/0146167205277093 
Reinhart, R., J., (2018, August 24). One in Three Americans Have Felt the Urge to Protest. 
 https://news.gallup.com/poll/241634/one-three-americans-felt-urge-protest.aspx 
Rho, E. H. H., (2019, Novermber 27). Political hashtags like #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter
  make people less likely to believe the news. The Conversation US. 
 https://theconversation.com/political-hashtags-like-metoo-and-blacklivesmatter-
 make-people-less-likely-to-believe-the-news-126415 
Rickford, R. (2016, January). Black lives matter: Toward a modern practice of mass struggle.
  In New Labor Forum (Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 34-42). Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA: SAGE 
 Publications. 
School’s censorship of Black Lives Matter posters violates free speech, ACLU says (2019, 
 Nov 23), Fox5 San Diego. Retrieved from 
 https://fox5sandiego.com/news/trending/schools-censorship-of-black-lives-matter-
 posters-violates-free-speech-aclu-says/ 
Simpson, T., & Kaufmann, E. (2019). Academic freedom in the UK. Policy Exchange.
 London. https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Academic-
 freedom-in-the-UK.pdf  
Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2000). Identity theory and social identity theory. Social 
 psychology quarterly, 13(3), 224-237. doi: 10.2307/2695870 
Stern, P. C., Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G. A., & Kalof, L. (1999). A value-belief-norm
  theory of support for social movements: The case of environmentalism. Human 
  ecology review, 81-97. 
81 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Tajfel, H (1982). Social identity and intergroup relations (1st Ed; pp. 1-11). Cambridge 
University Press; Editions de la  Maison des Sciences de l’Hommes. 
Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1979). An integrative theory of 
 intergroup conflict. Organizational identity: A reader, 56, 65. 
Tausch, N., Becker, J. C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R. N. 
 (2011). Explaining radical group behavior: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to 
 normative and nonnormative collective action. Journal of personality and social 
 psychology, 101(1), 129. 
Van Zomeren, M. (2014). Synthesizing individualistic and collectivistic perspectives on  
 environmental and collective action through a relational perspective. Theory & 
 Psychology, 24(6), 775-794. doi: 10.1177/095935431458617 
Van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2012). On conviction's collective 
 consequences: Integrating moral conviction with the social identity model of 
 collective action. British Journal of Social Psychology, 51(1), 52-71. doi: 
 10.1111/j.2044-8309.2010.020000.x 
Vonasch, A. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2017). Unjustified side effects were strongly intended: 
 taboo tradeoffs and the side-effect effect. Journal of Experimental Social  
  Psychology, 68, 83-92. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2016.05.006 
Vonk, R., & Van Knippenberg, A. D. (1994). The sovereignty of negative inferences: 
 Suspicion of ulterior motives does not reduce the negativity effect. Social 
 Cognition, 12(3), 169-186. 
Wetts, R., & Willer, R. (2019). Who Is Called by the Dog Whistle? Experimental Evidence
  That Racial Resentment and Political Ideology Condition Responses to Racially 
 Encoded Messages. Socius, 5, 2378023119866268. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/
 2378023119866268 
82 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Wike, R., Silver, L., & Castillo, A. (2019). Many across the globe are dissatisfied with how
  democracy is working. Pew Research Center, 29. Retrieved from 
 https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-
 dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/ 
Zhong, R., (2020, February 6). China Clamps Down on Coronavirus Coverage as Cases 




Attitudes Towards Censorship 
Appendix A: Study 1 Questionnaire 
Attitudes Towards Political Statements 
Study 1 Information Sheet 
My name is Kate Fox and I am a Masters student in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Canterbury. You are invited to take part the research project “Attitudes 
Towards Political Statements”. Thank-you very much for choosing to complete this 
questionnaire today.  
The aim of this study is to investigate how individuals react to certain political statements. In 
today’s session, we will progress through a series of questions that look at this. The first 
section of the questionnaire will ask you to answer some general demographic questions. 
Once you have completed this initial section, you will move onto the main section of the 
study. You will be required to consider your views towards certain statements, and answer 
some short questions about your personal views in regards to these statements. If you choose 
to continue onto to the questionnaire, please take your time in completing your responses, and 
answer as truthfully as you can.  
Tasks will be completed on the online site Amazon Mechanical Turk. Questions will be 
completed on a computer, in which case you’ll respond pressing a button, or typing your 
response. I will record your responses so we can add them to responses given by others and 
analyse them. 
   For taking part in the project, you will receive $0.25, through the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
payment system . The study will take between 2-3 minutes to complete. If you want to stop at 
any time for a break during the questionnaire you are more than welcome to do so. You may 
choose to withdraw from questionnaire at any stage by exiting the browser. Please note 
however, that after this session has finished, information cannot be withdrawn from the 
project as it will be deidentified when it is entered into the computer. 
The results of this study may be published, but you can be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered. To ensure confidentiality no names will be used on the 
questionnaires or in the final report. Only Andrew Vonasch and Kate Fox will have access to 
the data, which will be securely stored electronically by password protection. After the 
conclusion of the experiment Andrew Vonasch will keep a copy of the data for five years, 
after which it will be destroyed. A thesis is a public document and will be available through 
the UC Library. 
This project is being carried out as a requirement for a Master’s Thesis by Kate Fox under the 
supervision of Dr. Andrew Vonasch, who can be contacted at the email addresses below. 
Kate or Andrew will be happy to address any concerns you have about participation in the 
project. 
Contact details as follows:  Kate Fox  kate.fox@pg.canterbury.ac.nz     Dr. Andrew Vonasch  
Phone: +6433690726  andrew.vonasch@canterbury.ac.nz 
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics 
Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
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ethics@canterbury.ac.nz)   
 Human Ethics Committee:  Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Attitudes Towards Political Statements 
Study 1 Consent Form 
This research examines how people react to political statements, and is being conducted by 
University of Canterbury Masters’ student Kate Fox under supervision of Dr. Andrew 
Vonasch. All responses are being collected through the online survey site Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. By signing this consent form you are agreeing to participate in a study 
about your opinions and views in regards to certain political statements. Your involvement is 
to fill out the following survey. This will take you a maximum of three minutes. The data you 
provide is collected anonymously so the researchers will not know your identity. Your 
participation is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time by closing the browser. As the 
questions are of a moral nature you may have emotional reactions to some of them. If you 
feel you are unable to continue you can stop the survey by closing the browser. The data will 
be stored securely and used as part of a Master of Arts thesis at the University of Canterbury, 
and may also be published in international peer-reviewed journals.    I understand what 
is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. I understand that participation is 
voluntary and I may withdraw at any time without penalty. As all data collected has no 
identifying information, removal of any information which has already been entered into the 
system is impossible.  I understand that any information or opinions I provide will be kept 
confidential to the research team and any indirectly identifiable information will be deleted 
during data collection. Any published or reported results will not identify the participants. 
 I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be available through the 
University of Canterbury library.  I understand that all data collected for the study will be 
kept in locked and secure facilities and/or in password protected electronic form. 
Confidential, de-identified data will be stored indefinitely on Open Science Framework to 
ensure other researchers can independently replicate and verify that conclusions from the 
study if they wish.  I understand the risks associated with taking part and how they will be 
managed.  I understand that I can contact the researcher Kate Fox at 
kate.fox@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or supervisor Andrew Vonasch at 
andrew.vonasch@canterbruy.ac.nz for further information. If I have any complaints, I can 
contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 
4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz)  By clicking the button below, I agree 
to participate in this research project. 
o Yes  (1)  
o No (this will take you to the end of the survey)  (2)  
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o  
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements, and explain 
your reasoning.  
 
Start of Block: Control First 
 
Do you support the phrase "Asian Lives Matter"?  
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
In the box below please explain the reasoning for your response: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you think that Asian people should receive fair treatment and justice under the law? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
In your opinion does "Asian Lives Matter",  mean the same as "Asian people should receive 
fair treatment and justice under the law"? 
o Strongly Disagree (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
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In your opinion, do people mainly say "Asian Lives Matter" to signal their political 
allegiance? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
End of Block: Control First 
 
Start of Block: Control Rephrased First 
 
Do you think that Asian people should receive fair treatment and justice under the law? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Do you support the phrase "Asian Lives Matter"?  
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
In the box below please explain the reasoning for your response: 
________________________________________________________________ 
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In your opinion does "Asian Lives Matter",  mean the same as "Asian people should receive 
fair treatment and justice under the law"? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
In your opinion, do people mainly say "Asian Lives Matter" to signal their political 
allegiance? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
End of Block: Control Rephrased First 
 
Start of Block: BLM Rephrased First 
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Do you think that black people should receive fair treatment and justice under the law, 
alongside all people? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Do you support the phrase "Black Lives Matter"? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
In the box below please explain the reasoning for your response: 
________________________________________________________________ 
In your opinion does "Black Lives Matter", mean the same as "black people should receive 
fair treatment and justice under the law"? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
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In your opinion, do people mainly say "Black Lives Matter" to signal their political 
allegiance? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
End of Block: BLM Rephrased First 
 
Start of Block: BLM First 
 
Do you support the phrase "Black Lives Matter"? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
In the box below please explain the reasoning for your response: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you think that black people should receive fair treatment and justice under the law, 
alongside all people? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
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In your opinion does "Black Lives Matter", mean the same as "black people should receive 
fair treatment and justice under the law"? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
In your opinion, do people mainly say "Black Lives Matter" to signal their political 
allegiance? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
End of Block: BLM First 
 
Start of Block: ALM First 
 
Do you support the phrase "All Lives Matter"? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
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In the box below please explain the reasoning for your response: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you think that everybody should receive fair treatment and justice under the law? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
In your opinion does "All Lives Matter", mean the same as "everybody should receive fair 
treatment and justice under the law"? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
In your opinion, do people mainly say "All Lives Matter" to signal their political allegiance? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
End of Block: ALM First 
 
Start of Block: ALM Rephrased First 
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Do you think that everybody should receive fair treatment and justice under the law? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Do you support the phrase "All Lives Matter"? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
In the box below please explain the reasoning for your response: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
In your opinion does "All Lives Matter", mean the same as "everybody should receive fair 
treatment and justice under the law"? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
93 
Attitudes Towards Censorship 
In your opinion, do people mainly say "All Lives Matter" to signal their political allegiance? 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat Disagree  (3)  
o Somewhat Agree  (4)  
o Agree  (5)  
o Strongly Agree  (6)  
 
End of Block: ALM Rephrased First 
 
Start of Block: Demographics 
 
Age (in years): 
▼ 18 (1) ... 60+ (44) 
What gender do you identify with?  
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Other  (3) ________________________________________________ 
 
What ethnic groups do you identify with? 
________________________________________________________________ 
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What race do you identify with? 
o Black  (1)  
o White  (2)  
o American Indian, Alaska Native, or Native American  (3)  
o Asian or Pacific Island  (4)  
o Hispanic  (5)  
o Other  (6) ________________________________________________ 
 





































o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Please select your preferred political party: 
o Democratic Party  (1)  
o Republican Party  (2)  
o Libertarian Party  (3)  
o Green Party  (4)  
 
End of Block: Demographics 
 
Start of Block: Debrief 
 
Attitudes Towards Political Statements 
Study 1 Debriefing Form for participants 
This study was interested in how people respond to various political statements, and some of 
the processes behind individual’s reasoning for their responses. In order to understand this 
further we asked for information about your viewpoint to three statements and/or questions, 
your reasoning for your response.  Furthermore, you answered a range of demographic 
questions.  
Three politicized statements were used during the study, as well as three questions which 
intended to act as synonyms for the statements, that is, we rephrased the statements to avoid 
any political association while still retaining the core meaning behind the statements. You 
were randomly assigned to see two of the possible six options. The three political statements 
were “All Lives Matter”, “Black Lives Matter”, and “Asian Lives Matter”. The three non-
politicized questions were “Do you think that everybody should receive fair treatment and 
justice under the law?”, “Do you think that black people should receive fair treatment and 
justice under the law?”, and “Do you think that Asian people should receive fair treatment 
and justice under the law?”.     We used a mixture of known political statements and non-
politicized questions to examine if there is a difference in response due to the political 
association attached to the statements. Furthermore, the “Asian Lives Matter” and the 
corresponding non-politicized question were included as a control condition. 
 Now that the full nature of the study has been discussed, if you no longer wish to contribute 
your information, you may withdraw from the study if you wish by exiting the 
browser. Furthermore, as the full nature of the study has been discussed, you may not return 
to the questionnaire to adjust your responses in anyway. There will be no negative penalty to 
you if you withdraw, however, in accordance to Amazon Mechanical Turk procedure, 
payment will not be given if you exit the questionnaire. Please note however, that after this 
session has finished, information cannot be withdrawn from the project as it will be 
deidentified when it is entered into the computer.        You are welcome to discuss this study 
further by contact myself or Andrew Vonasch, via the contact details provided below. If you 
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feel the need to talk to anyone further about the effect this study has had on you, outside 
support can be gained from Mental Healthline in the form of an anonymous and confidential 
telephone counselling service (1-888-457-8965), or you are welcome to speak with your 
medical practitioners.     Contact details for the researchers are as follows:      Kate Fox  
kate.fox@pg.canterbury.ac.nz      Dr. Andrew Vonasch  
andrew.voansch@canterbury.ac.nz        Thank you again for participating in this study.      
Kind regards, 
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Appendix B: Study 2 Questionnaire 
 
Attitudes Towards Political Statements 
Information Sheet 
My name is Kate Fox and I am a Masters student in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of Canterbury. You are invited to take part the research project “Attitudes 
Towards Political Statements”. Thank-you very much for choosing to complete this 
questionnaire today.  
   
The aim of this study is to investigate how individuals react to certain political statements. In 
today’s session, we will progress through a series of questions that look at this. You will be 
required to consider your views towards certain statements, and answer some short questions 
about your personal views in regards to these statements. Furthermore, you will also be asked 
to share your thoughts and feelings that you may have towards a hypothetical person who 
shares their own personal view. The last section of the questionnaire will ask you to answer 
some general demographic questions. If you choose to continue onto to the questionnaire, 
please take your time in completing your responses, and answer as truthfully as you can.   
 Tasks will be completed on the online site Amazon Mechanical Turk. Questions will be 
completed on a computer, in which case you’ll respond pressing a button, or typing your 
response. I will record your responses so we can add them to responses given by others and 
analyse them. 
   
For taking part in the project, you will receive $0.50, through the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
payment system . The study will take between 4-5 minutes to complete. If you want to stop at 
any time for a break during the questionnaire you are more than welcome to do so. You may 
choose to withdraw from questionnaire at any stage by exiting the internet browser. Please 
note however, that after this session has finished, information cannot be withdrawn from the 
project as it will be deidentified when it is entered into the computer. 
   
The results of this study may be published, but you can be assured of the complete 
confidentiality of data gathered. To ensure confidentiality no names will be used on the 
questionnaires or in the final report. Only Andrew Vonasch and Kate Fox will have access to 
the data, which will be securely stored electronically by password protection. After the 
conclusion of the experiment Andrew Vonasch will keep a copy of the data for five years, 
after which it will be destroyed. A thesis is a public document and will be available through 
the UC Library. 
   
This project is being carried out as a requirement for a Masters Thesis by Kate Fox under the 
supervision of Dr. Andrew Vonasch, who can be contacted at the email addresses below. 
Kate or Andrew will be happy to address any concerns you have about participation in the 
project.       Contact details as follows:     Kate Fox  kate.fox@pg.canterbury.ac.nz     Andrew 
Vonasch  Phone: +6433690726  andrew.vonasch@canterbury.ac.nz     This project has been 
reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, and 
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participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, 
University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz)      Human Ethics Committee:  Email: human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Attitudes Towards Political Statements 
Consent Form 
This research examines how people react to political statements, and is being conducted by 
University of Canterbury Masters’ student Kate Fox under supervision of Dr. Andrew 
Vonasch. All responses are being collected through the online survey site Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. By signing this consent form you are agreeing to participate in a study 
about your opinions and views in regards to certain political statements. Your involvement is 
to fill out the following survey. This will take you a maximum of five minutes.  
The data you provide is collected anonymously so the researchers will not know your 
identity. Your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw at any time by closing the 
browser. As the questions are of a moral nature you may have emotional reactions to some of 
them. If you feel you are unable to continue you can stop the survey by closing the browser. 
The data will be stored securely and used as part of a Master of Arts thesis at the University 
of Canterbury, and may also be published in international peer-reviewed journals.     
I understand what is required of me if I agree to take part in the research. I understand that 
participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time without penalty. As all data 
collected has no identifying information, removal of any information which has already been 
entered into the system is impossible.  I understand that any information or opinions I 
provide will be kept confidential to the research team and any indirectly identifiable 
information will be deleted during data collection. Any published or reported results will not 
identify the participants.  I understand that a thesis is a public document and will be 
available through the University of Canterbury library.  I understand that all data 
collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure facilities and/or in password 
protected electronic form. Confidential, de-identified data will be stored indefinitely on Open 
Science Framework to ensure other researchers can independently replicate and verify that 
conclusions from the study if they wish.  I understand the risks associated with taking part 
and how they will be managed. I understand that I can contact the researcher Kate Fox at 
kate.fox@pg.canterbury.ac.nz or supervisor Andrew Vonasch at 
andrew.vonasch@canterbruy.ac.nz for further information. If I have any complaints, I can 
contact the Chair of the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 
4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz)  By clicking the button below, I agree 
to participate in this research project. 
o Yes  (1)  
o No (this will take you to the end of the questionnaire)  (2)  
End of Block: Introduction 
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Start of Block: Starting Survey Blurb 
 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements, and explain 
your reasoning.  
 
Start of Block: ALM 
 
I identify with the movement "All Lives Matter" 
o Fully disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Fully agree  (7)  
 
I agree with the idea that all lives matter 
o Fully disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Fully agree  (7)  
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End of Block: ALM 
 
Start of Block: BLM 
 
I identify with the movement "Black Lives Matter" 
o Fully Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Fully Agree  (7)  
 
I agree with the idea that black lives matter 
o Fully disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Fully agree  (7)  
 
In the box below please explain the reasoning for your response: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: BLM 
 
Start of Block: Intro 
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Thank-you. In the next section of this survey you will be presented with a hypothetical 
scenario. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement to the various statements which 
relate back to the scenario.  
 
End of Block: Intro 
 
Start of Block: BLM - Scenario 
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You are out in a public space and see someone wearing a t-shirt with the slogan "I support 
#BlackLivesMatter" and using a megaphone to broadcast their support for Black Lives 
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End of Block: BLM - Scenario 
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Start of Block: BLM - Hidden Motives 
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To what extent do you think that this person publicly sharing their support for "Black Lives 
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End of Block: BLM - Hidden Motives 
  
Start of Block: ALM - Scenario 
 
You are out in a public space and see someone wearing a t-shirt with the slogan "I support 
#AllLivesMatter" and using a megaphone to broadcast their support for All Lives Matter to 
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When you see this person out sharing their support for the statement "All Lives Matter" do 
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When you see this person out sharing their support for the statement "All Lives Matter" do 
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Do you think that because this person is publicly sharing their own personal views towards 
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End of Block: ALM - Hidden Motives 
 
Start of Block: Demographics 
 
We will ask you to enter some general questions about yourself.  
 
Age (in years): 
▼ 18 (1) ... 60+ (44) 
 
Which gender do you most identify with? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Other  (3) ________________________________________________ 
 
Which ethnic group do you identify with?  
o Hispanic  (1)  
o Not Hispanic  (2)  
 
What race do you identify with?  
o White  (1)  
o Black  (2)  
o American Indian, Alaska Native, or Native American  (3)  
o Asian or Pacific Islander  (4)  
o Hispanic/Latinx  (5)  
o Other  (6) ________________________________________________ 
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o o o  o  o  o  o  
On Social 




o o o  o  o  o  o  
 
Please select your preferred political party: 
o Democratic Party  (1)  
o Republican Party  (2)  
o Libertarian Party  (3)  
o Green Party  (4)  
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Attitudes Towards Political Statements 
Debriefing Form for participants 
This study was interested in how people respond to various political statements, and some of 
the processes behind individual’s reasoning for their responses. Furthermore, we were also 
interested to see if individuals would indicate that they may engage in censoring behavior 
towards others. Censorship refers to the act of supressing communication because it is 
perceived as being unacceptable or non-conforming with one’s beliefs.      
In order to understand this further we asked for information about your viewpoint to one of 
two political statements, your response to a seeing an individual wearing a politically charged 
t-shirt, and your various motivations for answering the way you did.  Furthermore, you 
answered a range of demographic questions. The two political statements that were of interest 
were “Black Lives Matter” and “All Lives Matter”.      
Now that the full nature of the study has been discussed, if you no longer wish to contribute 
your information, you may withdraw from the study if you wish by exiting the browser. 
Furthermore, as the full nature of the study has been discussed, you may not return to the 
questionnaire to adjust your responses in anyway. There will be no negative penalty to you if 
you withdraw, however, in accordance to Amazon Mechanical Turk procedure, payment will 
not be given if you exit the questionnaire. Please note however, that after this session has 
finished, information cannot be withdrawn from the project as it will be deidentified when it 
is entered into the computer.      
You are welcome to discuss this study further by contact myself or Andrew Vonasch, via the 
contact details provided below. If you feel the need to talk to anyone further about the effect 
this study has had on you, outside support can be gained from Mental Healthline in the form 
of an anonymous and confidential telephone counselling service (1-888-457-8965), or you 
are welcome to speak with your medical practitioners.      
Contact details for the researchers are as follows:   
Kate Fox  kate.fox@pg.canterbury.ac.nz      
Dr. Andrew Vonasch  andrew.vonasch@canterbury.ac.nz       
Thank you for your participation.       
Kind regards,  Kate Fox (Masters student, University of Canterbury), Dr. Andrew Vonasch 
(University of Canterbury).       
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Appendix C: Correlation Matrix for ALM condition 
Correlation Matrix for Participants in the ALM condition 
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 0.400  
-
0.773
 —          





 0.338  
-
0.397
 0.519  —        





 0.414  
-
0.699
 0.804  0.474  —      





 0.429  -
0.693
 0.830  0.520  0.829  —    




 0.436  
-
0.444
 0.615  0.380  0.651  0.672  —  
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Appendix D: Correlation Matrix for BLM Condition 
Correlation Matrix for participants in BLM condition 
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 -0.021  —              





 -0.356  0.129  —           





 -0.317  0.178  0.376  —         
   p-value  < .001  0.009  < .001  —         
Bad Person  
Pearson's 
r 
 -0.479  0.165  0.758  0.392  —      





 -0.499  0.296  0.698  0.423  0.809  —    




 -0.210  0.310  0.647  0.260  0.694  0.720  —  
   p-value  0.002  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  —  
 
